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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite their growing popularity, bottom-up, innovation-based development efforts are failing to 
make a significant social impact at the Bottom of the Pyramid (BOP). Merely inventing widgets for 
development – like affordable solar lanterns, improved cookstoves, and bicycle-powered machines – 
is not enough. They must move from the lab to the land, into the hands of the people they are 
intended to benefit. Innovations in scalable, sustainable models for social impact technology 
dissemination are desperately needed, lest these technologies be designed in vain. 
 
In this thesis, I first discuss previous failures in social impact technology dissemination, beginning 
with the Appropriate Technology movement and continuing with the efforts of multinational 
corporations that have tried selling into the BOP. Through field research in southern India, I then 
analyze the current efforts and experiments of small and medium enterprises. Although there are 
pockets of relative success in the field, there is no truly outstanding scalable and financially 
sustainable model for dissemination. There are multiple reasons for this, including the expenses 
taken on by manufacturers when they attempt to establish and operate their own distribution 
channels and the lack of technology aggregation, which has the potential to lower dissemination 
costs. 
 
Finally, I describe my experiences co-founding Essmart, a rural distributor of social impact 
technologies. This effort is based directly on my field research. Essmart’s goals are to bridge the gap 
between global manufacturers of social impact technologies and rural end users. The venture gives 
rural retail stores access to technologies that improve their customers’ lives.  
 
Through months of reflective practice, I have come to recognize the importance of building 
mutually beneficial and mutually dependent relationships with BOP stakeholders. This is one of the 
most important ways to create and ensure social impact at the Bottom of the Pyramid through 
innovation. 
 
 
Thesis Supervisor: Bishwapriya Sanyal 
Title: Ford Professor in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning 
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Commonly Used Abbreviations 
AT................................................................................................................................. Appropriate technology 
BOP............................................................................................................................... Bottom of the Pyramid 
FMCG............................................................................................................ Fast-moving consumable goods 
HUL .....................................................................................................................................Hindustan Unilever 
iDE .................................................................................................... International Development Enterprises 
MFI...............................................................................................................................Microfinance institution 
MNC .........................................................................................................................Multinational corporation 
NGO...............................................................................................................Nongovernmental organization 
SME..................................................................................................................... Small and medium enterprise 
UN............................................................................................................................................... United Nations 
UCID ..............................................................................................User-Centered Innovation Development 
UNDP..........................................................................................United Nations Development Programme 
RENE .......................................................................................................Rural Energy Network Enterprises 
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SSF............................................................................................................................. Sri Siddhanta Foundation 
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1 Introducing the Problem of Social Impact Technology 
Dissemination for Bottom-Up Development 
When I was an undergraduate student at MIT, “doing international development” meant 
participating in the following process. First, register for D-Lab, an academic program that introduces 
engineering students to technology design for development. Then, invent an ingeniously simple new 
technology for the rural poor. Next, apply for a fellowship or grant from the MIT Public Service 
Center or the MIT International Development Initiative. Use the money to visit an international 
field site an attempt to implement a short-term service learning project over the summer and winter 
vacations. After testing your technology in the field, return to MIT and build a team around your 
new invention. Compete for cash prizes in the MIT IDEAS Global Challenge or the MIT $100K 
Business Plan Contest to further prototype development. If dedicated enough, start a nonprofit 
organization of for-profit social enterprise to finally implement your technology upon graduation.  
This university-initiated pipeline encouraged budding engineers to apply their technical skills 
to address issues of global poverty and environmental sustainability. Over time, MIT students have 
produced an diverse array of compelling, innovative technologies for development, including a 
bicycle-powered corn sheller, an off-terrain wheelchair that uses levers to shift gears, multiple non-
electrified household water filters, a solar-powered parabolic cooking stove, and many more. 
MIT’s world of international development may sound unique, but it is really just a 
microcosm of a larger technology, business, and social movement for innovation-based initiatives 
aimed at poor communities, households, and individuals at the Bottom of the Pyramid (BOP) 1. 
Since the early 2000s, there has been an explosion in innovative technologies and business models 
for low-income end users.  
Evidence of bottom-up, innovation-based development is seen in a globally lauded incentive 
and support structure for it. International competitions such as the Dell Social Innovation Challenge 
focuses on product design for low-income users. Business plan competitions hosted at academic 
institutions boast “emerging markets” or “social business” tracks. Organizations like Echoing Green 
fund fellowships for social entrepreneurs. Philanthropies like The Rockefeller Foundation award 
money to ventures that specifically innovate to achieve social missions.  “Social impact investment 
funds” now evaluate companies’ fiscal and social bottom lines. The World Bank Institute and 
                                                
1 The “Bottom of the Pyramid” (also known as the “Base of the Pyramid,” the “BOP,” the “Next Billion,” or the “Next 
4 Billion”) has been relabeled and redefined by multiple authors. Despite the semantics, the shared concept of the global 
poor as a market for new technologies remains constant.  
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USAID offer grants for innovation-based solutions to development. In 2010, the Indian 
government even established the National Innovation Council, which seeks to “discuss, analyze, and 
help implement strategies for inclusive innovation in India” (National Innovation Council, 2010).  
Obviously, there is a growing commotion around bottom-up, technology-based, 
entrepreneurial-driven development efforts. However, as the late Alice Amsden noted, investment in 
grassroots innovation does not align with economic development at the grassroots level (Amsden, 
2012). There is a gap between number of technology-based solutions for the BOP and the amount 
of social impact these solutions are actually having. I witnessed this divergence through my 
experiences with MIT’s D-Lab and my research in rural southern India: while D-Lab was creating 
technologies designed for the poor, in the field these technologies are not known, not available, and 
not making an impact.  
Technological invention is not enough. Technologies must get into the hands of end users, 
or else they are designed in vain. Previous efforts were not good enough. In the early days of 
designing technologies for development, dissemination was driven by charities and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Their efforts were project-based, limited in scale, and 
limited in funding. Many nonprofits fail to sustainably impact poor communities through 
technologies because they cater to donors, not end users. It was not uncommon to hear anecdotes 
about hosting well-publicized ribbon-cutting ceremonies for new technology programs but failing to 
train users or provide long-run maintenance due to the lack of incentives and funding scarcity.  
Afterward, multinational corporations (MNCs) tried a heavy-handed selling approach, but 
their inappropriate business models and lack of community-level connections did not result in 
successful technology dissemination either. Now, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are 
attempting to commercialize life-improving technologies for the BOP in a way that is scalable, 
financially sustainable, and embedded at the local level. They are still having problems. Players in the 
innovation-for-development space are just now beginning to recognize the need to innovate how 
they get new technologies into the hands of the people they were designed for. 
My research addresses the following questions: First, why have previous attempts to 
disseminate technological innovations to the BOP been unsuccessful? Second, what business models 
for dissemination for social impact technologies are being tried, and how are they faring? Third, 
based on what is learned from earlier efforts, how can technology dissemination be done in a 
scalable, financially sustainable way at the BOP? 
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I explore these questions through looking at business models for technology dissemination 
at India’s BOP. These examples were collected through qualitative research methods, including 
interviews and field visits, and secondary research. I then attempt to address the problems of 
technology dissemination with Essmart, a rural distribution start-up that I co-founded with Jackie 
Stenson upon my return to MIT. In this process, my team and I progressed through MIT’s 
innovation-for-development pipeline and learned about the necessity of mutually beneficial 
community-level relationships to build scalable and sustainable business models at the BOP. 
Chapter I continues explaining the problems of social impact technology dissemination. 
Chapter II introduces prior attempts through the Appropriate Technology movement and 
multinational corporations’ BOP 1.0 efforts. Chapter III describes the emergence of small and 
medium enterprises in this space and explains examples from India. Chapter IV introduces Essmart, 
a business model innovation for social impact technology dissemination that grew out of this 
Master’s thesis research. Its goals are to bridge the gaps within the innovation-for-development 
community through relationships with technology manufacturers and rural retail shops at the BOP. 
Chapter V concludes with reflections about technology dissemination and the global community 
that incentivizes and supports innovation for BOP development. 
Great technologies for the poor in developing countries have emerged and are still emerging 
from a diverse group of players in the global innovation-for-development community. For these 
technologies to achieve their intended social impact, they must be disseminated through business 
models that are scalable, financially sustainable, and based on relationships that are mutually 
beneficial and mutually dependent at the Bottom of the Pyramid.  
1.1 The Hype: So Many Widgets for Development 
After decades of failed grassroots-level poverty alleviation initiatives, players at the BOP are 
still trying to devise successful, scalable, and sustainable solutions for bottom-up development. 
Innovative social impact technologies for the poor have been given the limelight. These technologies 
– sometimes called “appropriate technologies,” “frugal innovations,” “BOP innovations,” or a 
myriad of other names – include treadle pumps and drip irrigation systems for low-income rural 
farmers, bicycle and solar powered mobile phone chargers, fuel-efficient smokeless cookstoves, non-
electrified water filters, and affordable solar lanterns, among others. These technologies have been 
the focus of philanthropic organizations worldwide, and they are now being promoted through 
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design competitions. Universities have adopted them as the core of new programs’ curricula. 
Mainstream media has even given social impact technologies a nod. In 2010, Amy Smith, the 
founder of MIT’s D-Lab, was named as one of Time Magazine’s 100 Most Influential People. 
Celebrities and politicians like Julia Roberts and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced a 
national commitment of $50 million to the United Nations Foundation’s Global Alliance for Clean 
Cookstoves, which plans to distribute 100 million clean-burning stoves for rural areas by 2020 
(Broder, 2010). 
The idea of designing technologies for use at the BOP is not new. Its beginnings can be 
tracked to the 1950s, when conventional post-World War II development schemes were not creating 
new jobs as expected. Around that time, British economist E.F. Schumacher began thinking about 
new technologies for non-agricultural job creation in rural areas. The concept of these technologies 
for low-income populations morphed considerably over time. Their social missions have extended 
far beyond income-generation to poverty alleviation, environmental sustainability, healthcare, 
energy, and education. Today, the idea of “design for the other 90%” has been described as a 
“growing movement.” Paul Polak, founder of International Development Enterprises (iDE) and 
author of Out of Poverty, describes the current product design situation as: “The majority of the 
world’s designers focus all their efforts on developing products and services exclusively for the 
richest 10% of the world’s customers. Nothing less than a revolution in design is needed to reach 
the other 90%.” This revolution has begun. 
Unsurprisingly, academic institutions are a popular source of technology design. In India, the 
government-funded Rural Technology Action Group operates on multiple university campuses.  Its 
mission is to involve faculty and students in projects that address the scientific and technological 
needs of rural organizations. Additionally, nonprofit and nongovernmental organizations focus 
specifically on technology design for development. Design that Matters, an MIT seminar launched 
by MIT Media Lab graduates in 2001, is now a full-fledged nonprofit organization that engages in 
low-cost design for social enterprises in developing countries. The Oregon-based Aprovecho 
Research Center designs improved biomass cookstove and hosts the annual Stove Camp, a 
weeklong gathering for cookstove enthusiasts around the world to share knowledge and build 
stoves.  
Other organizations organize or identify grassroots technology innovators from the 
developing world. For example, The Lemelson Foundation, based in Portland, Oregon, established 
Recognition and Mentoring Programs in India, Indonesia, and Peru to address these issues by 
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discovering innovations and providing support for inventors and entrepreneurs, such as design 
prototyping and business incubation. Anil Gupta’s Honey Bee Network in Gujarat, India attempts 
to acknowledge local geniuses and increase the informal knowledge network through a database of 
over 100,000 locally produced ideas, innovations, and knowledge practices. 
There are hundreds of organizations designing or identifying innovative, social impact 
products for the poor around the world. The appeal of technology-based solutions for the BOP is 
understandable. Compared with the slow, nontransparent interventions of public policy and 
community mobilization, these technologies are tangible manifestations of hope that can, in theory, 
have an immediate social impact. Their design processes are inclusive of do-good designers, 
engineers, and students who want to become involved in grassroots development projects. As a 
result, these widgets for development are easy to generate buzz around in the Western world of aid, 
philanthropy, and public service. 
1.2 The Failure: Technological Innovations Fail to Impact Lives Because 
They Do Not Move from the Lab to the Land 
There is a very distinctive problem with social impact technologies for bottom-up 
development. No matter how well-designed they may be, there is no guarantee that these social 
impact technologies will reach the millions of people for whom they were designed. Technology 
dissemination, not technology invention, is the real challenge to impacting lives of the BOP through 
innovation.  
As of yet, no organization – public, private, or nonprofit – has painted the big picture of 
how to move these technologies out of the lab and into the land. Globally, philanthropic and 
government-funded initiatives have failed to disseminate technologies in ways that are sustainable, 
scalable, and replicable. For example, the Indian Institute of Science’s Centre for Sustainable 
Technologies has been developing clean-burning cookstoves for the past 35 years. From 1983 to 
2002, the government embarked on the unsuccessful National Programme on Improved Chulhas 
(Cookstoves). The program was considered a failure. The custom-built stoves were not appropriate 
for customers’ energy needs or cooking habits, and scalable dissemination was impossible because 
stoves were made on-site by local artisans and entrepreneurs.  Quality control and user education 
were nonexistent, program administration was cumbersome, monitoring was nil, and government 
subsidies for the stove seemed to decrease use and maintenance.  Plus, there was no accountability 
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for poor program performance (Barnes, et al., 1994; Jagadish, 2004). Who is to say that the UN’s 
Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves will not suffer from many of the same problems?  
Technology-designing organizations are only recently beginning to recognize dissemination 
as a significant problem. Programs like the MIT International Development Initiative began offering 
Technology Dissemination Fellowships in 2010 to allow for “targeted dissemination and transfer of 
appropriate technologies developed at MIT in recent years” (MIT IDI, 2012). Afterwards, MIT D-
Lab’s Technology Dissemination Program was established in 2011 “as a response to key issue within 
international development and social entrepreneurship: despite a high level of excitement, 
engagement, and talent among academic and research communities, too many development 
technologies still fail to reach their potential for social impact at scale” (MIT D-Lab, 2012). In 
Spring 2012, MIT D-Lab offered its first D-Lab: Supply Chain class to encourage undergraduates to 
design ways to make D-Lab technologies available to end users.  
Outside of MIT, there are even more proponents of innovations in technology 
dissemination. For example, Daniel Schnitzer, founder of a company dedicated to creating clean 
energy supply chains in Haiti, reiterated the problem statement in his November 2011 TEDxTalk in 
Pittsburgh. He explained that “inventing is the easy part” but “getting your product to people who 
can benefit from it the most” is the real challenge (TEDxTalks, 2012). The simple concept is gaining 
traction; Schnitzer’s talk has received over 175,000 views on the TEDx website. Another influential 
supporter of innovations in dissemination is iDE founder Paul Polak. In September 2010, he wrote 
on his blog: 
“Over the past 30 years, I’ve looked at hundreds of technologies for developing 
countries. Some provided elegant solutions for challenging technical problems. Some 
were big and clumsy. Some were far too expensive. Some of were beautifully simple 
and radically affordable. But only a handful were capable of reaching a million or 
more customers who live on less than two dollars a day. If you succeed, against all 
odds, in designing a transformative radically affordable technology, you still have 
addressed only 25% of the problem. The other 75% is marketing it effectively, which 
requires designing and implementing an effective branding, mass marketing and 
last mile distribution strategy.” 
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1.3 A Possible Solution and its Limits: Business Model Innovations for Last-
Mile Dissemination  
As engineers tinker away at their newest widgets for development, for-profit companies are 
attempting to apply business acumen to the BOP. Quoting Vinod Khosla, a billionaire venture 
capitalist and co-founder of Sun Microsystems: “There needs to be more experiments in building 
sustainable businesses going after the market for the poor. It has to be done in a sustainable way. 
There is not enough money to be given away in the world to make the poor well off” (Bajaj, 2010). 
Since the early 2000s, MNCs have been viewing the poor as tremendous market opportunities. This 
idea, popularized by C.K. Prahalad in his 2004 book, The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid, has 
received support from other scholars like London and Hart (2004), Anderson and Markides (2007), 
Arnould and Mohr (2005), Seelos and Mair (2007), and Vachani and Smith (2008).  
When seen as potential consumers, the BOP is a “latent market” (Prahalad, 2004) for 
affordable and innovative products that satisfy unmet needs. Market-based activities serve a dual 
purpose. First, they benefit the BOP by increasing this population’s access to new products. Second, 
companies profit from serving this vast, untapped market (Chatterjee, 2009).  
Designing technologies for the poor and selling technologies to the poor go naturally hand-
in-hand. If executed properly, their melding would address many problems with charitable-based 
efforts of technology design and dissemination. If technologies are sold to poor end users through 
market mechanisms, incentives are aligned so that technology suppliers are accountable to end users. 
A market-based model also generates profits that can be reinvested into the company or 
returned to investors. The potential to generate profits leads to increased investment sums and the 
eventual scaling up of a company’s technology-based development efforts. This is something that 
nonprofit organizations could never achieve unless they solicit donations.  
Thus, companies have seen that the prospect of selling innovative technologies can, in 
theory, be win-win for all involved parties. Low-income populations have a large number of unmet 
needs. If someone designs low-cost products addressing these needs, then latent demand will be 
brought out. Selling the products at scale is relatively easy because there are an incredible number of 
poor people. 
This approach has been attempted, but most have fallen terribly short. Doing business in the 
BOP is not that easy! A February 2012 New York Times’ article about technologies for development 
raised the following questions: “How do you build a market for a technology focused on people 
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with no money? How do you physically get it to where it needs to be? How do poor people acquire 
it? How can it be adopted on a wide scale? How do you make it last?” (Rosenberg, 2012).  
These are questions that companies have been trying to answer. MNCs led the first wave of 
marketing social impact products to the BOP, but they failed because of their sell-at-all-costs 
mentality that alienated them from local communities. SMEs are now leading the second wave of 
social impact technology dissemination. Organizations that design technologies, such as academic 
programs and design-centered nonprofits, have spun out small and medium enterprises to sell 
technologies in a manner that is theoretically more economically sustainable and scalable than 
donor-funded programs. Some SMEs call themselves “social enterprises,” which loosely means that 
they apply business principles to pursue social missions2.  
Social enterprises’ efforts are being recognized by international organizations as innovation-
based, market-oriented solutions that hold the key to scaled social impact. The World Economic 
Forum’s Technology Pioneers of 2012 includes four startups that deliver some type of product or 
serve for the Bottom of the Pyramid (WEF, 2011). Examples of these innovative SMEs include 
d.light, the small-scale solar LED designer that was born in Stanford’s Entrepreneurial Design for 
Extreme Affordability and KickStart (previously ApproTEC), the Kenyan manufacturer of the 
Super MoneyMaker, a treadle pump that can pull water from its ground source and push it uphill. 
However wonderful this sounds, SMEs are struggling just like the MNCs that came before 
them. Achieving economies of scale and generating profits – or at least covering costs – is difficult 
but necessary to make a long-term, transformative, social impact. A prior winner of the MIT $100K 
Business Plan Competition Emerging Markets Track has decided to disband all manufacturing of its 
technology to focus exclusively on sales and distribution, according to an internal employee. In a 
different example, EGG Energy a company that develops battery technologies, has shared its 
struggles with the marketing and pricing of its battery rental service. If the company fails to capture 
new customers, then its current estimates for growth, scale, and economic viability are useless.  
Since profitability in the BOP is based on the low margin-high volume equation, scale is 
imperative for SMEs to achieve economic viability. Unfortunately, reaching more customers is 
immensely difficult for these firms, as they are generally not financially endowed. Financial 
bootstrapping from the startup phase is assumed, and there not much room for failure. SMEs’ social 
impact technologies are sold at a price that is low enough for target low-income end users to afford, 
                                                
2 Like nonprofit organizations, social enterprises have social goals. Like traditional commercial enterprises, social 
enterprises must achieve financial sustainability through profits from sales, even though their main objective is not to 
maximize profits (Yunus, 2007). 
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but the price and volumes need to be high enough to compensate for the firms’ many costs: 
transactions costs of doing business with poor, fragmented markets, transportation costs of reaching 
rural areas, high costs of customer acquisition such as advertising for push-products, poor and 
nonexistent distribution systems, variable costs of capital and, sunk costs of research and 
development, and fixed costs of running a business. To stay financially viable, SMEs may cut 
important services like after-sales service, which sets up their own demise in the long-term by 
tarnishing their brand. Even competition between SMEs with similar offerings can result in driving 
down the price of their technologies. When this happens, no SME is able to scale.  
Needless to say, failure is a very real possibility for a new SME entering the BOP space, no 
matter how well intentioned they are. This is especially true if they do not consider how to 
overcome or are ignorant of the very real, very costly on-the-ground challenges to doing business at 
the BOP. The consequences of failure can also be costly to society; every entrepreneurial failure is a 
waste of the limited global investment that is set aside for international development purposes. In 
reality, despite the hype, only a handful of companies have successfully disseminated social impact 
technologies to BOP markets. These initiatives are, in Prahalad’s words (2004), “but islands of 
excellence in a sea of deprivation and helplessness.”  
1.4 The Context: Rural India, Where Difficulties and Social Innovation 
Abound  
To explore the innovation-for-development space, I turn my attention towards the 
environment and examples in India. Statistics about India’s Bottom of the Pyramid are both 
delightful and frightful. On one hand, the numbers can be read as a gigantic opportunity. India’s 
BOP is defined as households in the bottom four expenditures quintiles that spend less than US$75 
per month on goods and services. This represents a whopping 114 million households (CDF-IFMR, 
2004). The future holds even more promise. Analysts predict that consumers earning over US$5 a 
day will increase from 50 million to 150 million by 2020, and the dynamics of rural consumption are 
changing rapidly in the favor of businesses. As a market, India’s rural BOP market in India is huge 
and growing quickly.  
On the other hand, India’s BOP is highly fragmented and riddled with obstacles. There are 
627,000 Indian villages spread over 3.2 million square kilometers (Anderson and Markides, 2007). 
Commonalities across villages include financial hardships, domestic constraints, difficult living 
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conditions, and lack of basic information for making informed decisions. Income levels are low and 
volatile, and ready access to financial institutions and services is unavailable. Restricted mobility and 
limited travel patterns slow the dissemination of knowledge. Language and literacy variations across 
regions prevent cost-effective marketing and communication materials. Because of variations in 
settlement type, income levels, expenditure, and culture, households at the BOP have unique 
preferences. Therefore, successful marketing to the BOP requires a high degree of expensive 
product customization (Shukla and Bairiganjan, 2011). 
Financial hardships and difficult living conditions understandably shape the attitudes that 
households at the BOP have about new products. Compared to “pull” products like fast moving 
consumer goods that require little demand stimulation, socially useful products offered in BOP 
markets are “push” products. These require enormous effort and resources to scale demand and 
communicate the added benefits to potential consumers. It is of no help that there are currently no 
prominent mass media communication channels to reach the BOP and no brands targeting rural 
consumers across multiple product categories. BOP consumers may deny or not recognize their 
latent needs. They pursue fulfillment of more tangible needs because of historical purchasing 
decisions, product associations, conventional wisdom, and limited, volatile budgets. They also avoid 
making independent purchasing decisions for new products when the products have no social 
backing from trusted opinion leaders or social circles (Shukla and Bairiganjan, 2011). 
Not only do customers shape the challenges of working in the Indian BOP space, but the 
operating environment – the “sea” in which firms swim – also creates obstacles for companies. In 
some cases, ill-planned, poorly executed, and intermittent government schemes have adversely 
affected BOP customers, priming them to avoid market-based initiatives. Experiences with shoddy 
products and government subsidies have skewed customers’ perceptions about the quality and price-
points of new cooking stoves, making the implementation of a long-term market-based solution 
difficult. Rural markets’ lack of infrastructure, such as roads, water channels, electricity and 
communications, also creates barriers to entry for all products in terms of the physical flow of goods 
and information about new products. Geographical challenges like extreme weather conditions and 
hostile terrain present transportation and storage requirements, and sparse population density of 
India’s hinterland prevents easily attainable economies of scale.  
This is the context where bottom-up, innovation-based development efforts are now being 
pursued. These initiatives are bolstered by the nation’s long history with technologies for rural 
development and a robust social sector, which is possibly the world’s largest and encompasses about 
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3.3 million nongovernmental and nonprofit organizations (Shukla, 2010). Social businesses have 
found a home in India, which has been deemed a “hotbed” for social enterprises that pursue social 
missions through their offered products, services, or supply chains (Clinton, 2010). Furthermore, the 
President of India declared that 2010 to 2020 would be the “Decade of Innovation” (National 
Innovation Council, 2010).  
Because of the incentives and support around innovation-for-development, India seems like 
an environment where SMEs would succeed in commercializing social impact technologies. 
However, although every Indian technology-based SME includes a plan for scaling up, they typically 
lag far behind their goals. For instance, SELCO India has only installed 120,000 solar home energy 
systems, and improved cookstove companies Envirofit and First Energy have only sold 300,000 and 
475,000 stoves, respectively. This is in a nation where there are over 140 million rural households. 
Although these SMEs offer innovative technology-based solutions for local populations, they face 
difficulties reaching more customers, scaling up their businesses, and creating financially sustainable 
ventures.  
1.5 The Methodology: Qualitative Research and Action Research in India 
My research addresses the following questions: My research addresses the following 
questions: First, why have previous attempts to disseminate technological innovations to the BOP 
been unsuccessful? Second, what business models for dissemination for social impact technologies 
are being tried, and how are they faring? Third, based on what is learned from earlier efforts, how can 
technology dissemination be done in a scalable, financially sustainable way at the BOP? Successful 
bottom-up, innovation-based development initiatives defined as scalable, financially sustainable, and 
are built on quality, mutually beneficial relationships with other BOP players.  
To answer my research questions in the Indian context, I plunged into development efforts 
in both India and the US. First, I collected examples of Indian SMEs that disseminate social impact 
technologies to poor end users. I studied these companies’ social and economic goals, strategies for 
dissemination, and successes and failures. These examples were gathered through qualitative 
research methods: interviews with social entrepreneurs across urban and rural India; lab visits to 
social impact technology designers at academic institutions, NGOs, and SMEs; conferences that 
congregate the major players in India’s burgeoning field of social entrepreneurship; field visits to 
rural retailers and villages that model themselves after Gandhi’s ideals of village self-sustenance; 
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presentations given by BOP-targeting entrepreneurs; and secondary research of recent academic 
papers, published case studies, magazine articles, and more current blog posts.  
My second goal was to address the technology dissemination problems that I saw in the 
field. Upon returning to MIT from my research in India, I co-founded Essmart, a rural distribution 
start-up that addresses problems in current technology dissemination practices. Essmart aims to 
bridge the gap between technology suppliers and rural retail stores. Through this process, I entered 
funding competitions, conducted surveys, ran pilots, wrote business plans, created financial models, 
raised capital, and essentially became one of the entrepreneurs that I was studying. These activities 
gave me a unique perspective on entrepreneurs working in the BOP, such as the tension of what 
they face from the field, where their business operations occur, and what they confront in the 
lab/boardroom/auditorium, where they are propelled by a funding environment that is 
disconnected from their target customers. Personal reflection from this eight-month (and 
continuing) experience has proven crucial to formulating my ideas about social impact technology 
dissemination and the innovation-for-development space. 
This research began as a means to understand the world of international development that I 
experienced as an MIT undergraduate. Throughout my three-year research and writing process, this 
thesis has become a reflection on technology dissemination and the increasingly popular movement 
of innovation-based development efforts. Although it sometimes has the qualities of a passing fad – 
filled with buzzwords and media hype – there is something substantial here that will leave its mark 
on the field of economic development, for better or for worse. Significant sums of money are 
already being poured into inventing new technologies for billions of lives at the Bottom of the 
Pyramid. However, for this money to not be wasted, these technologies must reach their intended 
beneficiaries through innovative models for dissemination that are scalable, financially sustainable, 
and based on mutually beneficial and mutually dependent relationships between different actors at 
the BOP. 
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2 Learning from Failed Innovation-for-Development Efforts: The 
Appropriate Technology Movement and Multinational 
Corporations 
Although the phrase “innovation-for-development” sounds hip and cutting edge, the 
concept of intentionally inventing technologies for grassroots-level international development is 
anything but new. For the past 60 years, nonprofit organizations have been designing “appropriate 
technologies,” which are small-scale, decentralized, labor-intensive, energy-efficient, 
environmentally-friendly technologies that are “appropriate” for local conditions. In the early 2000s, 
multinational corporations began designing products and technologies for the Bottom of the 
Pyramid, too.  
In this section, I discuss the background of two innovation-based efforts: the Appropriate 
Technology movement and BOP 1.0 – the first wave of multinational corporations that attempted 
to market goods to the BOP (Simanis and Hart, 2008). Their failures are able to provide insight into 
what can work for social impact technology dissemination for the BOP. 
2.1 Inventing Technologies for Development: The Appropriate Technology 
Movement’s Limited Dissemination Efforts 
The Appropriate Technology movement was formulated in the 1950s, produced countless 
widgets for development from the 1960s to 1980s, and died in the 1990s. Despite its eventual death, 
the movement did leave a legacy for today’s bottom-up technological innovations and produced 
lessons for modern-day innovators – namely that scalable, financially sustainable models for 
technology design and dissemination are required to affect bottom-up change at the BOP. 
2.1.1  E.F. Schumacher ’ s  Post -World War II Ideo log i ca l  Beginnings 
After World War II, top-down economic growth was the conventional development strategy 
for newly independent countries. Economic growth required the structural transformation of an 
economy from a rural, agrarian base to an urban, industrial base. Under ideal circumstances, the new 
industrial sector would create enough new jobs to absorb the unproductive, surplus agricultural 
labor that was resulting from fast population growth. The industrialization process was to occur 
through the mass importation of advanced technologies and the implementation of large-scale, 
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capital-intensive production methods, and the shift from rural to urban would bring about a net 
improvement in productivity for the entire economy. 
By the 1970s it had become evident that efforts to achieve economic growth through capital-
intensive methods of import substitution were failing in these developing countries. In developing 
countries that attempted ambitious industrialization, the growth of non-agriculture and urban 
employment had not matched the total economic growth rate or the growth in surplus rural labor 
(Willoughby, 1990). In certain contexts, only a handful of new jobs were created, and this resulted in 
emerging urban islands of high productivity but neglected agricultural peripheries (Akubue, 2000).  
The mass poverty created by industrialization deeply moved economist E.F. Schumacher. 
The situation, coupled with Gandhi’s visions of Gram Swaraj3 and the Sarvodaya4 movement, 
encouraged Schumacher’s thinking about alternative forms of development that would occur 
alongside industrialization. He advocated for the creation of non-agricultural jobs in rural areas, 
which would ameliorate unemployment and reverse rural-to-urban migration. 
To support production in rural areas, Schumacher came up with a new breed of technologies 
called “intermediate technology.” Intermediate technology would be labor-intensive, suitable for 
small-scale operations, and accessible to agricultural sector workers, in the sense that it would be 
relatively simple to use and easy to finance. Compared to expensive, imported, capital-intensive 
technology that replaced jobs, intermediate technology would create more jobs. Consequentially, 
intermediate technology would jumpstart a sustainable process of income generation and wealth 
accumulation in rural areas through small-scale production. 
In a 1965 issue of the Sunday Observer, Schumacher popularized intermediate technologies by 
arguing for a shift in aid policies toward them. In the same year, he founded the Intermediate 
Technology Development Group (Practical Action, 2011), now called Practical Action, and the 
Appropriate Technology (AT) movement was underway. 
2.1.2  The Rise  and Fal l  o f  the Appropriate  Technology Movement  
The AT movement was an ideological, social, and technology movement that developed and 
promoted “appropriate technology” – the new name for intermediate technology. Appropriate 
technology was characterized as “appropriate” for local environmental, economic, political, social, 
and cultural conditions. The idea of appropriate technology was cemented in 1973 by the 
                                                
3 Self-sufficient but inter-linked village republics with decentralized small-scale economic structure and participatory 
democracy. 
4 Literally meaning “universal uplift” or “progress for all,” this became the term for Gandhi’s ideal political philosophy. 
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publication of Schumacher’s seminal work, Small is Beautiful. By the mid 1970s, the average number 
of appropriate technology organizations created every three years almost quadrupled from the prior 
decade. The umbrella of appropriate technology was broadened to more fields, including energy, 
agriculture, and urban renewal (Leland, 2011). International organizations and government 
departments emerged as appropriate technology inventors, indicating the progression of a small-
scale movement to a legitimate technological choice.  
However, by the time the 1980s rolled around, the AT movement was already dying down. 
Funding from governmental organizations had never been much, and donor money was drying up 
because of the debt crisis and developing countries’ push for an export-orientation that neglected 
the poor. Additionally, because of its small scale and focus on collaboration with local groups, the 
AT movement was being seen as a disfavored, “passive” method of aid. After the Vietnam War, the 
American public had a particular distaste for such measures (Pursell, 1993).  
The movement was also dying down because technology development, not dissemination or 
implementation, was the primary focus. Engineers were designing “better mousetraps,” but no one 
was using them (Smillie, 2000). Participants of the AT movement naively assumed that appropriate 
technology would be readily adopted once end users saw the technology’s utility. By not realizing 
that appropriate technologies, despite their simple designs, benefited from support like training, 
maintenance, and administrative assistance, organizations were setting up their own demise (Leland, 
2011).  
In the early 2000s, at the tail end of the AT movement, some organizations attempted to 
address technology dissemination by practicing aspects of participatory development. This gradually 
morphed into participation by co-creation, where community members became involved in idea 
generation, concept evaluation, technology design, fabrication, testing, and evaluation (D-Lab, 2009). 
The hope was to ensure technology adoption and effectiveness by involving end users in the design 
process. While these efforts resulted in benefits for the involved communities, the decentralized, 
small-scale design and production processes were not easily scalable. Neither were they sustainable, 
as they required larger amounts of donor funding and volunteer work to operate. 
2.1.3  Why the Appropriate  Technology Movement Fai led 
By the end of the 1990s, there existed a network of AT organizations, a modest track record 
of successful projects and field experiments, and an academic literature about appropriate 
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technology. Major development players were still funding appropriate technology projects, but these 
efforts existed at the margins.  
Ultimately, the AT movement had failed to influence the pattern of industrialization and 
technological choice in mainstream society, policy, and development initiatives. Today, the AT 
movement as a historical event is regarded to have been “dead” since the end of the 1990s, although 
the term “appropriate technology” is still confusingly used with regard to technology-based 
development. The AT movement failed for many reasons, some of which are included here: 
• Technology designers largely focused on technology design, ignoring the 
processes of technology implementation and dissemination. 
• Appropriate technology production processes were small in scale, intensively 
using local rural labor and materials. Because they used localized technical 
knowledge and operated at a very small level, the economic opportunities created 
by the technologies reached too few people to affect widespread poverty. 
• Local and international efforts to develop technologies were fragmented, and the 
wheel was constantly reinvented. Amsden identified the similarities between 
small-scale technologies for development that were developed in the late 1950s 
and today (Amsden, 2012). In the popular novel entitled The Ugly American 
(1958), an engineer named Atkins offers his technical assistance with small-scale 
projects that include a simple bicycle-powered water pump. Similar bicycle-
powered technologies are still designed by young engineers today. 
• The small-scale, decentralized localized production of technologies led to poor 
quality control. This led to low-quality, short-lived, unreliable products. 
• Related to the issue of quality control: appropriate technologies were seen as 
inferior, undesirable products for “poor people.”  
• Although appropriate technologies were designed to not require elaborate 
trainings, the lack of holistic support systems for technologies still contributed to 
their lack of widespread use. 
• In an effort to manufacture technological marvels, financial self-sustainability 
was never a goal. Paul Polak uses the Animal-Drawn Wheeled Tool Carrier as an 
example. He writes, “… It cost far too much to be affordable to small African 
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farmers and it relied heavily on donor subsidies for distribution. It eventually 
died after wasting millions of dollars” (Polak, 2010). 
• The AT movement’s funding mechanisms were not financially sustainable in the 
long run. The movement was led by volunteers from faith-based organizations, 
engineers, doctors, and students, mostly from developed countries.  
• AT movement participants thought that technological change could occur 
without challenging the established power structures and that people would 
readily utilize appropriate technologies if they were obviously less expensive and 
better. Describing the AT movement, Winner writes that “by and large most of 
those active in the field were willing to proceed as if history and existing 
institutional technical realities did not matter” (Winner, 1986).  
• Some in the field thought that appropriate technology was a “utopian 
technology” that could “only be successfully applied on a large scale once an 
alternative form of society had been created” (Dickson, 1974). 
2.2 Seeking Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid: Multinational 
Corporations’ Clumsy Attempts at Technology Dissemination 
Soon after the AT movement died, an influx of multinational corporations began entering 
the development space. Although these companies are rooted in a history that is far from the AT 
movement, they still shape our thinking about technological and business model innovation for 
bottom-up development. In particular, these MNCs demonstrate how business models can be 
inappropriate for the BOP. 
2.2.1  Tapping C.K. Prahalad’s  Fortune at  the Bottom of  the Pyramid through New 
Innovat ions 
In 1998, management professors Stuart Hart and C.K. Prahalad were beginning to articulate 
the idea that low-income populations worldwide could be viable markets. Serving them would not 
only be profitable ventures but would also create social value for these populations. At the time, the 
idea of simultaneously generating money and social impact was met with skepticism. According to 
Hart, the Harvard Business Review neither rejected nor accepted his and Prahalad’s introductory article 
about the Bottom of the Pyramid for three years (Mahajan, 2007). 
 26 
It was not until after 9/11 did issues of worldwide inequality and poverty become important 
to business people. In 2002, the journal Strategy+Business finally published Hart and Prahalad’s article 
in a special issue that explored the relationship between security and sustainability. In their article, 
the Hart and Prahalad point to the growing income gap between the rich and the poor, reinforcing 
their view that the poor cannot participate in the global market economy, even though they make up 
two-thirds of the world’s population5. These four billion poor people represent a multitrillion-dollar 
market but have “remained largely invisible to the corporate sector.” The authors write, “Most 
MNCs automatically dismiss the bottom of the pyramid because they judge the market based on 
income or selections of products and service appropriate for developed countries.”  
Prahalad and Hart recognize that “doing business with the world’s 4 billion poorest people 
… will require radical innovations in technology,” and in his seminal work, The Fortune at the Bottom of 
the Pyramid, Prahalad proposes 12 principles of innovation in BOP markets. His recommendations 
for technological innovations incorporate financial, social, environmental, efficiency, and cultural 
goals. For instance, Prahalad writes that “product development must start from a deep 
understanding of functionality, not just form” and that “marginal changes to existing products in 
Western markets will not work.” He encourages innovators to “design products to work in hostile 
environments” and to “focus on (quantum jumps in) price performance.” In 2006, Prahalad slims 
down his recommendations for technological innovations and focuses on affordability and 
scalability (Prahalad, 2006). 
While Prahalad argued that money can be made by doing business at the BOP, he was not 
simply encouraging MNCs to squeeze the poor for money. Prahalad was genuinely concerned about 
economic development, wealth creation among the global poor, and poverty alleviation in low-
income communities. His 2004 book includes chapters about reducing corruption and large-scale 
social transformation through the involvement of the private sector in traditionally social activities. 
He was trying to marry large-scale social change with the for-profit business world – something that 
MNCs would have never considered before and that the nonprofit world thought was vulgar. 
2.2.2  Creat ing New Markets  with Clayton M. Chris tensen’s  Disrupt ive  Technolog ies  
Around the time when Prahalad was publishing, Clayton Christensen, a Harvard Business 
School professor, was contributing his ideas about technological innovation for the BOP. 
                                                
5 The annual per capita income of this “Tier 4” – based on purchasing power parity in US dollars – is less than 
US$1,500, the minimum considered necessary to sustain a decent life. 
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Christensen is famous for establishing the theory of “disruptive innovation” (Bower and 
Christensen, 1995). A disruptive innovation is a new technological innovation, product, or service 
that creates a new market and a new value network while eventually surpassing and disrupting a 
dominant paradigm. In contrast with “sustaining” innovations, which provide better quality or 
additional functionality to a company’s most demanding customers, disruptive innovations do not 
meet existing customers’ needs as well as currently available products or services6. Over time and 
through continuous innovation, disruptive innovations surpass currently available products and 
services and disrupt the existing market. The theory explains why new firms with relatively simple, 
straightforward solutions can beat powerful incumbents by creating new markets and without 
competition. For incumbents to maintain their growth rates and remain competitive in their current 
markets, diverting money and resources to disruptive innovations is irrational.  
In 2001 and 2002, Christensen and Hart began applying the concept of disruptive innovation 
to the BOP. Christensen argues that BOP markets are in a prime position to incubate disruptive 
technologies, as they are typically characterized by non-consumption and have been ignored by 
MNCs (Hart and Christensen, 2002). They write, “In much of the world, people’s basic needs go 
unmet. In these circumstances, new waves of disruptive technology deployed by companies making 
a great leap down the pyramid have an extraordinary potential to generate growth.”  
By stating this, Christensen provides a framework around technological innovation for the 
BOP that Prahalad never fully articulates. In their 2002 article in the MIT Sloan Management Review, 
Christensen and Hart put forth the fundamental conditions that lead to the success of a disruptive 
innovation, which also results in greater social good by creating jobs, generating revenues and 
market capitalization, and raising standards of living by making available cheap, high-quality 
products. In 2006, Christensen broadened his idea of disruptive innovation to “catalytic innovation,” 
defining them as “low-cost and simple but useful services for people whom traditional social sector 
organizations ignore” (Christensen et al., 2006).  
Both Prahalad and Christensen encourage technological innovations that target a previously 
ignored market. Since Prahalad also cares about creating social benefits through market mechanisms 
in the BOP, his technology recommendations focus on affordability and scalability. His target 
customers are the true BOP and earn less than US$1,500 per year. Christensen’s recommendations 
are slightly different. They focus on differentiation, not affordability. He assumes that customers 
have the money to pay for a product that will satisfy previously unmet needs in an unconventional 
                                                
6 One popular of a disruptive innovation was Southwest Airline’s budget airline tickets. 
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way. As a result, companies that take his advice do not innovate for the poorest of the poor. They 
often target the economic band that is slightly above the very bottom, which some have labeled the 
Emerging Middle. This is a viable business strategy that many MNCs are moving into, since no 
company has figured out how to successfully market to the Bottom of the Pyramid. 
2.2.3  Clunky Business  Models  for  Technology Disseminat ion at  the Bottom of  the 
Pyramid 
Prahalad and Christensen’s theories about the fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid and the 
potential of disruptive technologies at the BOP have encouraged many companies to design and sell 
products to the poor. This has been attempted so much that academics and entrepreneurs in rural 
areas have begun to lash out against MNCs’ efforts. Aneel Karnani of the Ross School of Business 
has argued that the Prahalad’s fortune is just a mirage and that MNCs’ BOP initiatives exploit the 
poor (Mahajan, 2007). Harish Hande, the managing director of SELCO, a solar home lighting 
company working in rural southern India, has said, “I am shocked, to say the least, that people are 
looking at the BOP in a very unidirectional way... Sell, sell, sell to the BOP, large markets, high 
potential growth... As a friend of mine said, many people live in poverty while a few live off 
poverty” (Karnani, 2005).  
While there are high-level concerns of ethics and social impact, there are also have very 
practical concerns of financial feasibility. The first wave of MNCs’ initiatives to sell products – 
especially goods with a purported a social impact – is considered by many to be a failure. The 
literature cites multiple reasons7, but for the purposes of this research, I highlight MNCs’ difficulties 
with product dissemination.  
Because rural distribution channels for social impact products do not exist, MNCs have 
created self-owned and operated networks. This is harder than imagined. MNCs are accustomed to 
de-integrating their activities to focus on core competencies (e.g. manufacturing), and they find 
themselves ill-equipped and floundering when trying to create a distribution network in a foreign 
environment (Eyring et al., 2011). All of this money and effort is invested in selling just a single 
product, too. Garrette and Karnani state the distribution problem well: 
                                                
7 Garrette and Karnani (2010) have brought up issues like: 1) MNCs see BOP needs as a market opportunity, even 
though many BOP individuals are not willing or able to pay for products to meet their needs and 2) BOP initiatives fail 
to take into account the opportunity cost of capital, which prevents them from attracting capital market investments that 
can be used to scale up. Thus, only companies with patience and deep pockets can have a chance to be successful at the 
BOP. Money that is currently invested in companies attempting to work at the BOP is charitable (grants) or “patient” 
capital from social impact investors. 
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“In many BOP initiatives, creating efficient and viable marketing and distribution 
support networks is an even bigger challenge than reducing the manufacturing cost 
of the product … Creating socially responsible distribution is essential for the 
success of market-based solutions to poverty. At the same time, creating a 
distribution network to reach the poor might be too expensive and contribute to the 
commercial failure of the project … Proprietary, exclusive, one-product distribution 
channels do not enjoy economies of scope and are very expensive, and unlikely to be 
the solution to the distribution challenge.” (Garrette and Karnani, 2010) 
Examples of MNCs’ distribution initiatives that have failed to reach scale include those for 
Essilor’s low-cost eyeglasses and Grameen-Danone’s enriched yogurt. Essilor sells glasses through 
its “refraction vans,” mobile optician shops that travel to villages and prescribe and sell eyeglasses to 
individuals. Eyeglasses cost about US$4. The company considered scaling up its operations from 
four vans to 1,000 to reach India’s hundreds of thousands of villages, but in 2010 the MNC was 
operating only eight vans. Even with donations and sponsorships, the project barely earns its cost of 
capital.  
In Bangladesh, Grameen-Danone embarked on an Avon-like, door-to-door, direct sales 
model for Shoktidoi, its enriched yogurt to alleviate child malnutrition. The MNC believed that 
female entrepreneurs, the Shokti ladies, were the only relevant distribution channels. Now, 
executives now acknowledge this strategy as a failure. Grameen-Danone began with 60 Shokti ladies 
in February 2007 but was left with only 37 ladies by December 2008. The best-performing Shokti 
ladies only sold 100 packages a day, which was half the expected sales level. Selling Shokitdoi was 
not a full-time job, and Shokti ladies are not incentivized to push for more. The company moved its 
target market away from rural areas and toward more organized retail in urban areas to remain 
sustainable. 
Hindustan Unilever Ltd.’s (HUL) Project Shakti is an oft-cited example of a relatively 
successful rural distribution network. Established in 2001 with a whopping $23 million in seed 
capital, Project Shakti (roughly translated to “empowerment”) uses a female sales force of door-to-
door Shakti ladies to sell small packages of personal products like soaps, lotions, and detergent at 
about a 10 percent margin. Internet kiosks advertise HUL’s product selection at the community 
level, and through a separate program, Shakti Vani, trained female communicators are sent to 
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schools and public areas to train and educate villagers. By 2007, Project Shakti covered over 80,000 
villages through a network of 30,000 entrepreneurs (Rangan and Rajan, 2007). 
However, despite these relative successes, MNCs selling technologies for development 
cannot learn too much from HUL’s Project Shakti. Shakti ladies sell products that already have a 
considerable amount of demand from the community. They sell a suite of products, not just one, so 
the costs of customer acquisition are lowered. Additionally, critics have noted that the turnover rate 
for Shakti ladies is incredibly high – at one point, the rate reached 50 percent within three months 
(Simanis and Hart, 2011). This could be due to a number of reasons, including the social stigma 
attached to women selling door-to-door and the limited incomes (about US$15 per month) brought 
home by the saleswomen.  
Project Shakti’s scale was not the consequence of organic growth. In hopes of being the first 
mover for consumer products at the BOP, HUL followed a resource-intensive push strategy. The 
company is crossing its fingers, waiting for increases in rural consumption for the long term. Project 
Shakti has not yet broken even, and few other companies, if any, are incentivized, willing, and able 
to commit so many resources to a rural distribution effort. Even under the best conditions that 
include pull products, large amounts of seed funding, and patience, it may not be financially viable. 
The nature of BOP 1.0 business models and relationships may have also led to dissemination 
failures. MNCs have been criticized for using business models that are based on an overly simplified, 
consumption-based understanding of the rural poor. They aim to “discover” latent markets by 
picking products that are either super cheap or super different and packaging them properly so that 
they will sell (e.g. in sachets). By focusing on merely selling to the BOP, MNCs fail to create 
mutually beneficial, mutually dependent income-increasing relationships with individuals at the 
BOP. These foreign business models that lack quality relationship building will lead to shallow 
commitments with the poor, which is not a good long-term strategy at the BOP. 
2.3 Thoughts: Settling on the Right Type of Technology and the Right type 
of Business Model for Dissemination  
The Appropriate Technology movement and BOP 1.0 efforts give us some insight into how 
to improve technological and business model innovations for bottom-up development. On the 
technology front, improvements have already been made. Today’s technological innovations for 
development are known by different buzzwords (e.g. “frugal innovation,” “inclusive innovation,” 
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“BOP innovations” “catalytic innovations,” “innovation under constraint,” “reverse innovation,” 
etc.). At their core, these technologies are similar to appropriate technologies because of their 
emphasis on financial accessibility and utility to rural end users. However, in contrast with the 
original notion of appropriate technologies, today’s technologies for development may focus on 
poverty alleviation instead of income generation, and they are probably mass-produced and not 
made at the village level. They are also likely designed for scale, which is something that even 
engineers steeped in the AT tradition have begun to realize as necessary.  
Today, most social impact technologies are produced by SMEs. These companies are 
currently experimenting with different strategies for technology dissemination, and they do not want 
to fall into the same traps as Appropriate Technology organizations or multinational corporations. 
Compared with AT organizations, SMEs need to be scalable and financially sustainable to stay in 
business. Compared with MNCs, SMEs have fewer financial resources but possess the innovative 
qualities of a start-up, are more adaptable to the local context, and are willing to embed themselves 
next to their customers, interacting directly with them instead of through an intermediary like a 
nongovernmental organization. Successful business models for social impact technology 
dissemination may be found among the current efforts of these SMEs. 
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3 Innovating Business Models for Technology Dissemination: The 
Examples of Small and Medium Enterprises in India 
The Appropriate Technology movement is dead, and BOP 1.0 is a failure. Although some 
academics look forward to a BOP 2.0 reboot (Simanis and Hart, 2008), I believe that more attention 
should be paid to the small and medium enterprises working at the BOP instead. At this moment, 
these SMEs are experimenting with a plethora of diverse business models and strategies for social 
impact technology dissemination. This is particularly true about SMEs in India, which is a nation 
that has been deemed a hotbed for social entrepreneurship and for technological, social, and 
business model innovation (World Bank Institute, 2012).  
In this section, I write about the SMEs that are innovating for bottom-up development. 
First, I discuss the emergence of these SMEs – a brief history of bottom-up development, the 
recently coalescing ecosystem that incentivizes and supports innovation, the innovators who 
establish companies, and the transformative process of ideas to businesses. Then, I describe and 
reflect upon the many examples of social impact technology dissemination that SMEs are furiously 
testing out in India. No one has discovered the silver bullet of technology dissemination at the BOP, 
but there is much to be learned along the way. 
3.1 Calling All Innovators: How Innovation-Based Small and Medium 
Enterprises Come Out of the Woodwork 
SMEs that work at the Bottom of the Pyramid do not appear out of nowhere. It is nearly 
cost prohibitive for MNCs to do business at the BOP, so how much more difficult must it be for 
less-endowed SMEs! Through my interviews with entrepreneurs working in India, it became evident 
that the innovation-for-development ecosystem plays a significant role in establishing, supporting, 
and growing these businesses. Because their relationships affect their scalability and financial 
sustainability, it is necessary to understand the ecosystem in which SMEs develop. 
3.1.1  Start ing the High-Leve l  Deve lopment Dialogue 
Development experts have long debated the effectiveness of bottom-up/small-
scale/marginal interventions, which come from decentralized entrepreneurs, creative inventors, and 
political reformers, versus the effectiveness of top-down/large-scale/transformational interventions, 
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which emanate from the policies and recommendations of an elite of political leaders and outside 
experts. There were multiple turning points in the debate, which dates back to the 1940s and 1950s, 
when the investment-heavy “Big Push” was advocated as the way to get countries out of poverty by 
permanently raising growth. In the 1950s, Hirschman’s theory of “unbalanced growth” partially 
endorsed marginal transformation, while P.T. Bauer in the 1960s criticized “Big Push,” centralized 
planning, and extreme government interventions. In the 1980s, structural adjustment programs 
revived the debate about top-down reform, and recently post-Communist countries in the 1990s 
were confronted with the choice between shock therapy and gradualism (Easterly, 2008). 
In the 2000s, the “Big Push” mentality resurfaced with the United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals. Some development economists, led by Jeffrey Sachs (2005), emphasized 
foreign aid to governments as the single solution to achieve them. But this was in direct contrast 
with the development literature, where there was a new focus on rigorously evaluating small-scale 
interventions. Randomized evaluations have pointed to the relative success of bottom-up, often 
technology-based interventions for poverty alleviation. These small-scale initiatives could bypass the 
“necessary conditions” like “good institutions” that seem to be required for top-down interventions 
to be effective. They could bypass corrupt bureaucracies altogether. 
According to Easterly, there are two types of development practitioners: the “planners” and 
the “searchers” (Easterly, 2006). Central planners cannot end poverty. Only economic and political 
searchers can end poverty through trial and error, getting feedback on what works, and expanding 
ones that work in an unplanned way. Easterly mentions C.K. Prahalad’s book, The Fortune at the 
Bottom of the Pyramid, as an example of how “the searchers in a free market do much better than aid 
agencies in solving specific problems of the poor.” Other searchers include Hindustan Unilever, 
which brought antibacterial soap and hand washing education programs to rural India, and 
Muhammad Yunus, who invited microcredit in Bangladesh. Easterly advocates for NGOs, private 
firms, and social entrepreneurs to become involved in the development space, providing more 
endorsement of bottom-up, potentially technology-based development initiatives. 
3.1.2  Creat ing an Ecosystem of  Incent ives  and Support  for  Bottom-Up Innovat ion 
Searchers and their bottom-up, innovation-based development efforts have been gaining 
traction. But where will these searchers come from? What would draw them out of the woodwork? 
Why would they choose to focus their innovativeness on development if their outside options are 
more lucrative and respectable? The innovation-for-development community has offered two 
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responses. The first is awarding cash prizes for the “best” innovative solutions to global problems. 
The second is creating a broader ecosystem of support from programs and partners. Both contribute 
to incentivizing innovators and legitimizing their work by bringing them attention and money to 
support themselves. 
3.1.2.1 Awarding Cash through Competitions 
In a 2003 workshop report entitled “Invention and Innovation for Sustainable 
Development,” which was sponsored by the MIT School of Engineering’s Lemelson-MIT Program, 
participants make the following short-term recommendation:  
“Awards and prizes with large cash sums should be established to motivate inventors 
and innovators everywhere to focus on sustainable development. Prizes could be 
sponsored by well-known institutions, and should be given high visibility through 
media channels. Prizes should focus on serving as incentives for solutions to large 
problems, and the prize money should also be applied to the commercialization and 
dissemination of the new solution.” (Lemelson-MIT Program, 2003) 
There are now many awards for aspiring innovators that come in the form of competitions, 
challenges, grants, and fellowships. Multilateral institutions and governmental organizations have 
gotten into the act. For example, the World Bank Institute hosts the Global Development 
Marketplace, a grant program that “supports the testing and scaling up of innovative ideas” (World 
Bank Institute, 2012). USAID hosts Development Innovation Ventures, which “aims to find and 
support breakthrough solutions to the world’s most important development challenges – 
interventions with the power to change millions of lives at a fraction of the usual cost” (USAID, 
2012). 
Educators at academic institutions have also organized competitions to incentivize student 
innovation for real-world problems. Case in point is the MIT IDEAS Global Challenge, which 
completed its 11th year in the spring of 2012. The competition has awarded over $400,000 to over 74 
teams (MIT IDEAS Global Challenge, 2012). Another example is the Indian Institute of 
Technology, Madras (IIT-M), which hosts Genesis, a business plan competition that is about 
“initiating innovations that combine enterprise with social responsibility” and offers Rs. 4 lakhs 
(US$7,500) as cash prize money to winners (Genesis, 2012).  
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Philanthropies have also spun their typical grant programs into competitions. For example, 
the Rockefeller Challenge will award up to nine $100,000 grants in 2012. The Rockefeller 
Foundation recognizes that “innovation in its modern forms is the key to solving many of today’s 
problems” and states that “finding and supporting innovations that will make an impact over the 
next 100 years will be the central component of all … [its] activities” (Rockefeller Foundation, 
2012). The Deshpande Foundation, spearheaded by Indian-born Gururaj Deshpande, supports 
emerging social enterprises by giving them money and the chance to test their ideas in the “Hubli 
Sandbox,” a rural area in northwest Karnataka (Deshpande Foundation India, 2012). 
Highly competitive awards are also available for individual entrepreneurs. These include the 
Echoing Green Fellowship, which provides more than $2 million in seed support to emerging social 
entrepreneurs each year. Typically just less than one percent of applicants are selected to receive up 
to $90,000 over two years to support the launch of their new organizations (Echoing Green, 2012). 
Echoing Green has funded inventor-entrepreneurs like Jodie Wu, the MIT mechanical engineer who 
founded Global Cycles Solutions in Tanzania.  
As participants of the 2003 Lemelson-MIT Program predicted, competitions, cash prizes, 
and grants have incentivized innovation for development, drawn attention to such pursuits, and 
given more credibility to individuals who choose to become inventor-entrepreneurs. The seed 
funding and media exposure that innovators receive from these competitions is helpful for getting 
started, but companies often find themselves in need of more follow-on funding to scale. 
3.1.2.2 Supporting Innovators through Programs 
Cash prizes are just one way to incentivize innovation-for-development. On their own, the 
monetary amounts are too small to make a significant impact. Additional funding and non-financial 
support are needed as long-term support for innovators working at the Bottom of the Pyramid. 
Business incubators help a great deal. One example is Villgro, which incubates, funds, and 
supports early-stage, innovative social enterprises in southern India. Since 2001, Villgro has 
supported 55 enterprises and secured Rs. 200 million (US$3.7 million) in follow-on funding. Its 
portfolio has included Servals Automation Ltd, a Chennai-based company that invented a kerosene 
and plant oil cooking stove, and a bamboo mat-weaving machine that mechanizes the weaving 
process for rural artisans8 (Villgro, 2009). 
                                                
8 Villgro is supported by the Lemelson Foundation, which has a specific mission to support technologies. Hence, its 
portfolio is mostly filled with inventions, as opposed to other organizations’ portfolios. 
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Social impact investing is another emerging sector that supports bottom-up innovators and 
entrepreneurs. Social impact investors are “interested in the pursuit of both financial and 
social/environmental returns together” (Goldmark, 2011). One social impact investor is Gray Ghost 
Ventures. It has invested in companies like Promethean Power Systems, which makes solar-powered 
refrigerators to cool milk at remote collection centers throughout India (Gray Ghost Ventures, 
2012). Another example is the Omidyar Network, which has invested in d.light (Omidyar, 2012). 
India’s academic institutions are also supporting innovation-for-development through new 
programs. For example, IIT-M established the Centre for Social Innovation and Entrepreneurship 
(CSIE) in 2010. The CSIE offers a social entrepreneurship minor to students and encourages faculty 
to create socially conscious projects around their research interests (CSIE, 2011). In an interesting 
move, MIT and Tata Trusts have joined forces to create a new university in India called the Tata 
Centre for Technology and Design. Its mission will be “to create a new discipline, and a new breed 
of engineers and faculty trained to overcome severe resource and cost constraints to create 
compelling, affordable new products and services delivered to underserved markets” (Foley, 2012).  
Finally, India’s national government has also become a proponent of innovation-for-
development efforts. The most telling manifestation of support is the National Innovation Council 
(NInC), which was approved by the Prime Minister in 2010. NInC exists to “discuss, analyze, and 
help implement strategies for inclusive innovation in India and prepare a Roadmap for Innovation 
2010-2020.” The NInC put forth this statement that relates to technological innovations: 
“We need to create a new model of Inclusive Innovation for India which can 
provide solutions for the people at the Bottom of the Pyramid. India needs more 
‘frugal innovation’ that produces more ‘frugal cost’ products and services that are 
affordable by people at low levels of incomes without compromising the safety, 
efficiency, and utility of the products. These innovations should also have ‘frugal’ 
impact on the environment to be sustainable in the long term. This model can lead 
the way in solving the challenges of development, demography and disparity for 
developing economies the world over.”  (National Innovation Council, 2010) 
The NInC incentivizes innovators for bottom-up development in two ways. The first 
incentive is an Innovation Challenge. In 2011, the NInC challenged innovators to “reduce drudgery 
for the working class population” (Planning Commission, 2012). An IIT-M team was one of the 
winners. The NInC’s second incentive is “risk funding, with which to seed early-stage ideas and 
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expand successful ones.”  One of NInC first initiatives is the India Inclusive Innovation Fund, 
which will be capitalized to an eventual Rs. 50 billion (US$940 million). Presently, the Fund’s 
proposal is under discussion with the Ministry of Finance (National Innovation Council, 2011). 
As seen from these examples, a support system for innovators is being built on the ground 
in India. Through the cross-sector integration of financial and non-financial support, these are even 
more reasons to innovate for bottom-up development at the BOP. 
3.1.3  Drawing in New and Old Innovators  for  the BOP 
The incentives and support systems seem to be working. The 2012 Dell Social Innovation 
Challenge received over 1,700 entrants, and the MIT IDEAS Global Challenge grows in 
participation and funding each year. These new innovators, equipped with a sense of idealism, a 
post-9/11 disillusionment, an increasing global awareness, a worldwide grumbling over economic 
inequality, a difficulty in finding conventional jobs, a desire to “be the change they wish to see in the 
world,” and a knack for creating a ruckus through social media are acting at the forefront of the 
movement for bottom-up, technology-based development initiatives at the BOP. 
These new players enter the international development community through different means. 
Due to egging on from their educators and the availability of funding for their projects, university 
students are designing affordable, low-tech tools for the BOP while being exposed to grassroots 
development. Designers and engineers fill the social sector’s technological innovation gap by 
applying the design process to solving social problems. Leading design firms are now working with 
community organizations to design new technologies for the poor9. Business students who are 
excited about creating simultaneous social and economic value find themselves entering business 
plan competitions that target social ventures.  
Innovators come from developing countries, too. Indian inventors and entrepreneurs are 
known for their jugaad, which is the Hindi word that has been loosely translated as “the gutsy art of 
overcoming harsh constraints by improving an effective solution using limited resources” (Radjou et 
al., 2012). While inventors are often nurtured in the country’s top-notch technical and management 
universities, there are also programs dedicated to recognizing rural inventors. One example is Anil 
Gupta’s HoneyBee Network, which is a database of over 100,000 locally produced ideas, grassroots 
innovations, and traditional knowledge practices (SRISTI, 2004).  
                                                
9 The contribution of designers to bottom-up, technology-based development efforts was recognized by the Cooper-
Hewitt Design Museum, which opened an exhibit in 2007 called “Design for the Other 90 Percent” (Cooper-Hewitt, 
2007). 
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3.1.4  Progress ing f rom Innovat ion to Enterpr ise  
There is a certain path that innovators travel as they progress from having an idea to 
establishing and running an enterprise. For many, the journey starts at a university, where student-
innovators have access to funding opportunities and resources. From here, innovators start with a 
seed of an idea, build a team, visit their field site, enter competitions, win small pots of money from 
these competitions, gain press, win fellowships, and raise follow-on funding from investors. 
After they win competitions and before they raise more significant funds, innovators begin 
operations in the field. Their work likely begins with pilots and small experiments – activities of true 
searchers as they figure out what is effective on the ground. For SMEs that design and manufacture 
a technological innovation for development, the field is where they learn that dissemination is much 
more difficult than invention. This where most of the real innovation happens: on the ground, away 
from the funding world. Business models for dissemination are what make or break a technology-
based SME for development.  
3.2 From the Lab to the Land: Current Technology Dissemination Efforts of 
Indian SMEs 
Now that we know where these businesses come from and how they are incentivized and 
supported, I can describe Indian SMEs’ technology dissemination efforts at the BOP. To describe 
what I have seen and learned, I identify four elements of technology dissemination: 1) marketing and 
education, 2) credit and financing, 3) distribution, and 4) after-sales service.  
Each element is important. Technological innovations for bottom-up development are 
typically push products that require demand creation. They are durable products that are typically 
affordable but require some type of financing scheme to align with the ebbs and flows in income of 
low-income end users. Making these technologies available in rural areas is also a challenge, as is 
ensuring that they will remain functional in the long run. Broken technologies are worse than having 
no technologies; not only do they become money sinks and village garbage, but they create distrust 
around new products in rural areas. 
There is still an experimental nature to creating business models for technology 
dissemination at India’s BOP. This is evidenced by the popularity of starting small through pilots or 
geographically confined operations before scaling up. SMEs create their business models for 
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technology dissemination from a mix and match of different elements, adjusting over time as they 
see fit, and dropping elements that do not work for them.  
The following sections describe different options for the steps of technology dissemination 
based off of existing examples in the field. In some cases, it was difficult to tease these elements 
apart; some business models for dissemination are so integrated that there is little differentiation 
between, say, financing and distribution, or the choice for one step is heavily dependent on the 
choice of another. However, I believe that this is a good scheme for understanding the options 
available to SMEs attempting to disseminate technological innovations for development at the BOP. 
3.2.1  Market ing and Educat ion 
For many of these social impact technologies, raising awareness and generating demand are 
the biggest obstacles to scalable and sustainable dissemination. This is particularly true for 
technologies that target health, which is not as tangible a need as food or shelter. As a result, the 
costs of customer acquisition are incredibly high. The following are examples of efforts that SMEs 
have tried to market their social impact technologies, to various successes. 
3.2.1.1 Village-Level Demonstrations 
In-person, village-level demonstrations are, by far, the most common way to market social 
impact technologies to the BOP. As I discovered during my surveys of rural retail shop owners as 
part of my research, just seeing a picture and hearing a description of a new technology is not 
enough. A demonstration and trial run are required. 
Demonstrations occur in different settings. For example, International Development 
Enterprises India (manufacturer and distributor of its own irrigation technologies) and ONergy 
(distributor of existing solar lighting technologies) have permanent demonstration centers where 
technologies are stocked, users are trained, and demonstrations are held. For ONergy, these Rural 
Energy Centers cover a 10 km radius and reach 30 to 50 villages (CSTS/Ayllu Energy Map, 2011). 
In another example, organizations like Frontier Markets, a distributor of solar lanterns in Rajasthan, 
India, set up temporary demonstration centers in commercial areas to draw public attention to their 
new technologies. Demonstrations may also occur without public fanfare and on a peer-to-peer 
(often female-to-female) basis, through rural entrepreneurs or sales forces. These types of 
demonstrations happen in households or at group meetings organized through nongovernmental 
organizations, microfinance institutions, self-help groups, or farmers groups. Marketing through pre-
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existing relationships – or at least, through relationships where the buyers and sellers consider the 
others as equals – establishes trust among customers who have already been exploited through sales 
of low-quality new products.  
I had the privilege of visiting customers, interacting with rural sales agents, and witnessing 
rural demonstrations in Thanjavur with the Institute for Financial Management and Research Rural 
Energy Network Enterprises Green Power Private Ltd. (RENE). Due to organizational issues, 
RENE shut down in 2011. However, in 2010, the start-up was primarily selling and distributing fuel-
efficient, lesser-polluting commercial cookstoves for small roadside restaurants. The company was 
experimenting with a last-mile distribution channel in villages around the state of Thanjavur, Tamil 
Nadu.  
One RENE demonstration that I attended was a true public spectacle, much to the pleasure 
of the company’s Operations Head. The technology under consideration was an improved tea stove, 
and it was directed at a restaurant owner whose work consisted of 70 percent tea. He was already 
using biomass to fuel his stove, as evidenced by the massive pile of timber outside his shop and a 
nearby pile of coconut husks. RENE’s all-male field staff decided to set up the tea kettle against a 
tree, and the kettle’s tall pipe attracted a crowd of 40 to 50 people. 
The water was supposed to require just 20 
minutes to boil, but it actually took about 40 
minutes. The RENE staff immediately recognized 
that the wood pieces had to be cut smaller than 
the restaurant owner had lying around. Someone 
brought out the machete, and RENE workers 
sweat as they tried to make the fire burn hotter. 
Although the demonstration did not appear 
terribly successful, the salesmen knew that the 
true decision-making process would occur over 
the next few days, away from the RENE sales 
team, and away from the eyes of the public.  
A significant amount of time (about two 
to three hours to make the trip and set up the 
demonstration), manpower (four RENE Figure 1: RENE tea kettle stove demonstration.  
(Photo by the author.) 
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workers), and money (especially on transportation, as these restaurants are far removed from busy 
commercial areas) was required to conduct a single stove demonstration. The sale was far from 
being guaranteed, as well. In two months of selling three models of commercial use stoves, RENE 
had sold 10 stoves through this marketing and demonstration method.  
Prior to embarking on selling commercial use stoves, RENE was selling household 
cookstoves. Because household cookstoves were used in the home, they required a different 
marketing model. Rural sales agent would conduct a live demonstration with a woman who 
personally knew 10 to 15 potential customers. The goal was to have these ladies promote the stove 
among their friends. Using very old-fashioned method of word-of-mouth and demonstrations, 
RENE was able to sell about 50 household stoves in three months. 
Nearly every rural technology dissemination model I witnessed or inquired about included 
an aspect of in-person village demonstration, regardless of the product or the distributor. As 
demonstrated from the field visit with RENE, demonstrations require time and human resources, 
and they are difficult to scale. However, they establish in-person trust relationships, which are 
essential to the buying decision for new products.  
3.2.1.2 Mass Media 
Among small and medium enterprises working at the BOP, the use of mass media (television 
commercials, radio commercials, and newspaper advertisements) is not very common. This is not to 
say that mass media is ineffective; on the contrary, because it is so effective, it is very expensive. For 
SMEs that manufacture a single social impact technology, the cost of customer acquisition through 
mass media is sky high. Additionally, all advertising mediums must be adapted to the regional 
language, which is another headache that suppliers have to consider when deciding to invest in it.  
I came across only one technology-based SME that experimented with mass media to 
market its product. This company was Envirofit, the manufacturer of improved biomass cookstoves 
that is headquartered in Bangalore, Karnataka. Envirofit offers a basic and premium cookstove, 
which are priced at Rs. 850 (US$17) and Rs. 1,400 (US$28), respectively. Through interviews with 
the company’s General Manager of India Operations and Senior Manager of Sales and Marketing, I 
learned that Envirofit’s sales strategy is to target the top of the BOP first, where households are 
aspiring for middle class and would be more willing to buy an alternative to a traditional stove10. 
                                                
10 Envirofit had tried targeting lower income segments, but these customers had to invest 20 to 25 percent of their 
annual incomes to buy the stove, even though they liked the technology. 
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These are households that make Rs. 7,500 to 35,000 
per month (about US$150 to US$700) – relatively 
high on the national income scale (Adappa et al., 
2010). 
Envirofit is trying to reach these households 
through the existing rural trade network. However, 
the company has found that for cookstoves to sell 
through rural retail stores, demand for the cookstoves 
must be generated so that customers arrive at the 
stores’ doorsteps. Hence, in the summer of 2010, 
Envirofit embarked on a mass media campaign. The 
supplier pulled out a color print advertisement in the 
Vijay Karnataka, a Kannada newspaper that is reaches 
70 million people in the state of Karnataka. The 
advertisement advertised the cookstove as part of a 
cookstove-mobile phone-mobile minutes bundle, 
which was offered through partnerships with telecommunications companies Reliance Mobile and 
Idea Cellular. The immediate goal was to provide a “carrot” to catch the attention of the household 
male, who is in charge of the family purse, and offer the cookstove as a “gift” for his wife. The long-
term goal was to generate word of mouth around the cook stove. 
The newspaper advertisement cost Rs. 250,000 (US$5,000) to run, which is a considerable 
sum of money for a new company. On the day that the advertisement was published, there were 
about 600 calls by the early afternoon. Ninety-five percent of the calls were from men. By the end of 
the day, there were about 2,000 calls. People had begun to inquire about cookstoves (and not just 
the mobile phone), and they were redirected to rural retailers. 
On July 22, 2010, Envirofit aired a television commercial. The television has about a 50 
percent penetration rate into rural Karnataka, which equals about 10 million households. It opens 
with a father cleaning his tractor (indicative of a higher income household with middle class 
aspirations). A boy comes back from school and sees his mother coughing as she is cooking above a 
smoky traditional stove. The boy pretends to cough to get his father’s attention. The father 
acknowledges that there is a problem with the stove but that he does not know what to do about the 
problem. His son tells him about the Envirofit cookstove, and the father and son hop onto a 
Figure 2: Envirofit newspaper advertisement that bundled a 
cookstove with a phone.  
(Vijay Karnataka newspaper, July 2010.) 
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motorbike to purchase the stove. Afterward, there is a 10-second spot about “health and happiness 
in the home,” which is Envirofit’s call to action against indoor air pollution. Finally, there is a 5-
second spot announcing the mobile phone package deal. Similar to the newspaper ad that was run a 
few days prior, this advertisement targets the household male in both the skit and the cookstove-
mobile phone-mobile minutes bundle. 
According to the Envirofit’s managing director, Harish Anchan, the product isn’t the 
problem for sales, but rather the message is. Thus, creating awareness about health benefits from the 
Envirofit cookstove and generating demand are Envirofit’s main goals. Mass media is the best tool 
to reach people at scale, and Envirofit hoped to sell between 50,000 to 100,000 stoves in three 
months because of the advertisement. However, mass media is also costly, and it is not guaranteed 
to be effective. The Senior Manager of Sales and Marketing was able to cite one inspirational, 
commercially successful improved cookstove: the BP (now First Energy) Oorja. But when the 
product launched, BP evidently spent between Rs. 60 to 80 crore (US$12-$16 million) on mass 
advertising and its commercial distribution network. Although the company sold over 400,000 by 
the summer of 2011 (larger than any SME to date, but still a small quantity in absolute terms), no 
SME can copy its activities because they lack the funds available to an MNC (Joshi, 2011).  
3.2.1.3 Product Co-Identification and Trial-Based Evidence 
While Envirofit took the large scale, mass media route for education and marketing its social 
impact technology, other companies have taken a bottom-up approach that involves future end 
users in identifying potential products and validating the effectiveness of new products.  Take, for 
example, Villgro Stores, which is the for-profit retail arm of Villgro, the technology-based social 
enterprise incubator in Chennai, India that is supported by the Lemelson Foundation.  
In a short case study written with Villgro Stores’ CEO, Ashutosh Sinha, and Head of 
Operations, Suresh Shanmugam, I explain how Villgro Stores puts considerable resources into 
convincing farmers to purchase new, organic agricultural inputs (Jue et al., 2011). Instead of blasting 
potential customers with advertisements (which they could not do even they wanted to because of 
the cost), Villgro Stores works with User-Centered Innovation Development (UCID) to identify and 
validate new technologies before introducing them to stores. This step protects farmers’ economic 
interests and supports Villgro Stores’ marketing. 
Farmers are involved with the co-development of Villgro Stores’ portfolio through problem 
definition, field-testing, and feedback. Villgro Stores stays up to date with farmers about their 
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agricultural problems, household and farming needs, and purchasing power and habits. UCID 
intervenes by searching for appropriate, affordable, and environmentally sustainable products 
through agricultural exhibitions, print media, and the Internet.  
Once a product is discovered, UCID selects experienced farmers to test new products on 
control and test plots. UCID then captures data like crop height or yield to demonstrate or debunk a 
new technology’s effectiveness. The results are relayed to suppliers as feedback, and successful 
products are incorporated into Villgro Stores’ portfolio.  
One obstacle to selling new technologies is convincing end users that they are worthwhile 
investments. Farmers are wary of products that could reduce crop yields. The UCID trial process 
provides two unique forms of information for farmers: 1) quantitative data demonstrating the 
benefit of organic products and 2) testimonials from respected local farmers. In addition to the trial 
process, Villgro Stores staff and rural sales agents spend significant time explaining their products’ 
economic benefits with farmers face-to-face. Selling proven products in such a personal way under 
the Villgro Stores brand builds trust, recognition, and loyalty.  
The marketing process is long, and it is unique to the business model adopted by Villgro 
Stores. The company is an aggregator and distributor of new agricultural inputs. In contrast with 
manufacturers that push their single technology into the BOP, Villgro Stores works with rural end 
users to understand what farmers need. Villgro Stores’ partner, UCID, actively searches for products 
to solve the problems that farmers already know they have. UCID tests these products to see how 
well they solve farmers’ problems. These solutions have tangible economic benefits, and sales are 
easier when end users have reason and confidence to invest in them. As a distributor of income-
increasing agricultural inputs, Villgro Stores can take on activities that technology manufacturer 
cannot. 
3.2.1.4 Thoughts: Reduce Costs through Aggregation, Educate through Technology, and 
Market as Aspirational Products 
Demand generation is one of the biggest obstacles to commercializing social impact 
technologies. Most efforts, with the exception of mass media, require in-person contact and serious 
relationship-building, which sinks time and resources but builds trust and a solid brand. This type of 
marketing is not cost-effective for single-product distributors, which makes wholesale aggregators 
able to lower the costs of customer acquisition. Although this complicates logistics (learning about 
one product is hard enough; try learning about 100), technology has the potential to plan an 
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important role here. For example, rural sales agents of multiple technologies can be equipped with 
videos that explain and answer common questions about their vast product catalogue. This would 
lower costs significantly while maintaining a personal face for the brand. 
Although I did not personally encounter any 
technology-based efforts for marketing social impact 
goods and technologies, many well-known ones are 
currently operating in the field. For example, Digital 
Green, a Microsoft research initiative, seeks to 
“disseminate targeted agricultural information to small 
and marginal farmers in India through digital video” by u 
sing participatory practices for content development and 
creating a repository of videos that are made by farmers, 
for farmers (Digital Green, 2008). There exist other 
potential avenues for marketing, such as via mobile 
phones, which are ubiquitous even in rural India. 
Finally, I noticed all new SMEs advertise their 
technologies as aspirational products – desirable products 
for an aspiring middle class, not products for poor 
people. This is a great first step for encouraging end users 
to invest in them.  
3.2.2  Credi t  and Financing 
For households at the Bottom of the Pyramid, 30 dollars a month may be expensive, but one 
dollar a day is affordable. One of the greatest takeaways from microcredit and pay-per-use shampoo 
sachets is that pricing and financing innovations are required to sell anything at the BOP. If an SME 
requires a low-income customer to buy a solar lantern in full with cash, the solar lantern may not 
sell. A financing scheme that allows customers to pay back over time is much more appropriate for 
rural customers’ income streams.  
If low-income end users cannot pay for the lanterns in full up front, then where does the 
financial burden lie? This is the question that SMEs are now wrestling with as they seek ways to 
finance their customers so that they can sell technologies. 
Figure 3: Envirofit's brochures advertise families that 
appear to be middle-income. (Brochure provided by 
Envirofit India Headquarters, Bangalore.) 
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3.2.2.1 Microfinance Institutions  
The main purpose of microfinance institutions (MFIs) is to provide financial services in rural 
areas, where people generally lack access to them. How organizations do this varies from MFI to 
MFI, but the larger ones have also been called upon as distribution (and customer financing) 
channels for goods. Many MFIs have already experimenting with leveraging their networks and 
loaning capabilities to push products like mobile phones, solar lanterns, improved cookstoves, and 
white goods like televisions, washing machines, and refrigerators (Shukla and Bairiganjan, 2011). For 
example, the solar lantern company THRIVE has sold roughly 50,000 lights through four MFIs in 
Northeast India (McAteer, 2011). 
One example of a social impact technology supplier that distributes through MFIs to take 
advantage of their financing capabilities is Envirofit, which distributes through MFIs in addition to 
distributing through traditional retail networks and large organizations. Envirofit promotes and sells 
its improved cookstove by partnering with Grameen Koota (GK), an MFI in Karnataka. MFI 
customers who are interested in purchasing an Envirofit stove can redeem a “stove coupon” for an 
Envirofit cooking stove at a local retailer. This coupon is worth the deeply subsidized price of Rs. 
500 (US$10). Over time, the MFI offers the customer financial product bundling to help her pay 
back the Rs. 500 cost. The role of the retailer is limited to redeeming the coupon from Envirofit at 
pre-fixed rates (Shukla and Bairiganjan, 2011).  
Ujjivan is an MFI that is active in urban and semi-urban India – a bit of a different market 
than most of the organizations discussed here. But still, lessons can be learned from their attempts 
to push products like Nokia mobile phones, Unilever water purifiers, and solar flashlights. Because 
of Ujjivan’s reach and rapport with low-income clients, manufacturers actually began approaching 
the MFI about offering loans with the technologies. When I had talked with someone at the 
organization in the summer of 2010, Ujjivan was exploring viable business models for financing 
these technologies. Even though they had not settled on a model, they were learning. For example, 
Ujjivan saw how loan officers would not push hard on nonfinancial products. Their reason was that 
they (and Ujjivan as an organization) did not want to be responsible for these products if and when 
they break. The end user will always associated the product with Ujjivan because of their existing 
relationship, and maintaining the Ujjivan brand is a must. 
There are a few additional issues related to using MFIs to finance social impact technologies. 
For example, there is little incentive for MFIs to offer loans for technological innovations. The 
ticket price is very low compared with the other loans that MFIs are accustomed to offering. For 
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example, Ujjivan was experimenting with loans for Rs. 2,000 (US$40) solar lanterns and Rs. 1,400 
(US$28) water purifiers. Additionally, these technologies do not generate income for loan receivers. 
This does not assist customers in paying back their loans with interest, which could be as high as 25 
percent per annum11. This high interest rate makes products seem expensive, which is another 
deterrent to wide technology dissemination.  
MFIs have been experimenting with financing end users’ purchase of new technologies. 
However, a more sustainable approach for MFIs that also supports technology dissemination is 
lending to rural entrepreneurs who sell these types of products. This has already been experimented. 
Loans are used as working capital and contribute to rural entrepreneurs’ larger and more varied 
inventories. MFIs are more willing to support these loans because they want to be repaid fully with 
interest, and in theory, income-enhancing loans should facilitate this process. 
3.2.2.2 Rural Banks 
In addition to microfinance institutions, rural banks can also help finance technological 
innovations for the BOP. Rural banks exist to provide financial services to populations in rural 
areas, where most people still borrow from informal sources. However, these banks have 
traditionally focused on the agricultural sector, which is why they were/are not very open to making 
loans for new, life-improving technologies. 
This mindset can change, though, with the compelling case of solid technological innovation 
and a forward-thinking SME. SELCO, the company that installs solar home energy systems in 
Karnataka, India, is famous for innovating customer financing. SELCO is already able to lower the 
cost of a solar home lighting system by customizing it to the basic needs of a rural household. But 
the company’s core financing innovation is actually “building financing relationships” with different 
financing organizations, including primarily rural banks  (Yale University School of Management, 
2010).  
When SELCO was founded in 1995, the biggest challenges was convincing rural banks to 
finance solar home energy systems for poor BOP households, as none of the banks had been in the 
business of financing any solar lighting technologies. SELCO’s first breakthrough was in 1996, when 
the company convinced Mlabhraba Grameena Bank, a subsidiary of state-owned Syndicate Bank, to 
offer the nation’s first solar consumer-loan program. Loan terms were set at 15 percent down 
payment, with repayment over 60 months at a 13.5 percent interest rate. Before giving out loans, 
                                                
11 This interest rate seems high, but the rate varies by MFI. For example, ONergy, a solar energy solution distributor, 
offers 12.5 percent of diminishing interest (McAteer, 2011). This rate could still be considered too high, though. 
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SELCO arranged for bank employees to be trained about the company’s solar products. The 
training was to build local branch managers’ trust in the reliability of solar technology and to help 
bank managers help customers seeking a loan. In this model, the bank would send payment directly 
to SELCO once installation and inspection of the solar lighting system were complete. Bank 
managers would be responsible to monitor debt repayment, and SELCO could focus on its core 
strengths of product design, installation, and after sales servicing. Although finding credit 
institutions to partner with was a high upfront cost, it had a snowball effect on financing for India’s 
entire solar industry. 
Altogether, SELCO’s financing network includes four commercial banks, nine rural banks, 
numerous farmer cooperatives, and MFIs. In some cases, SELCO arranged third party guarantors 
who underwrote loans for SELCO clients without sufficient collateral. Through this network, the 
SME has installed over 120,000 solar home lighting systems in India (Yale University School of 
Management, 2010). 
3.2.2.3 Technology-Enabled Financing 
Much more rarely seen in the field are examples of technology-enabled financing. One up-
and-coming company is Simpa Networks, which is headquartered in Bangalore. Simpa, which stands 
for “simple payment,” sells energy solutions on a “Progressive Purchase” basis. Simpa’s pay-as-you-
go model helps the rural poor buy solar home energy systems, which cost somewhere between 
US$200 and US$400. The technology lowers the system’s initial upfront cost and allows the 
customer to pay for the system in a flexible manner over the course of three to five years. This 
opens the doors for ownership opportunities.  
In the customer paying process, the customer first makes a small initial down payment on a 
small-scale solar home energy system, pre-pays for the energy service, and then tops up their system 
in small user-defined increments with their mobile phones. Each payment adds toward the final 
purchase price, and the system will not work unless the user pre-pays for the energy. This is similar 
to the pre-paid mobile phone system that most end users are already used to. Finally, when the 
system is fully paid for, it unlocks permanently and produces energy for free (Simpa Networks, 
2012).  
In an interview, Michael Macherg, Simpa’s Co-Founder, describes that Simpa addresses 
many issues for commercializing more expensive durable technologies for the BOP. First, many 
companies that try to provide solutions for lighting end up competing on cost, which results in less 
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expensive design. However, if cheaper design is pursued, then it’s difficult to achieve the aspired 
amount of energy. The difference between a single solar lantern and an entirely lit-up house 
demonstrates the point. Solar home energy systems provide higher quality lighting than solar 
lanterns, and the upfront cost should not prevent rural customers from investing in one. 
Additionally, the current financing schemes from rural banks for solar home energy systems require 
customers to pay on a fixed repayment schedule, but this might be hard for some customers to keep 
up with. Simpa provides more flexibility, and customers can pay back at a rate that suits them 
(Macherg, 2011).  
Simpa is working with SELCO because the Simpa model has the potential to help SELCO 
scale to different geographies faster. Because SELCO systems are currently financed through 
partnerships with local financing institutions, it cannot enter an area until those relationships are 
established. Simpa is a technological innovation that removes the need for these partnerships, and it 
helps quicken the dissemination of solar home lighting systems offered by SELCO. Simpa has a 
sales agreement with SELCO to sell 1,000 solar home systems in 2012, growing to over 5,000 
systems through SELCO and other distributors in 2013. Simpa plans to have sold 25,000 solar home 
energy systems with their technology by 2014 (Menon, 2012), but this requires establishing 
partnerships with other solar home system suppliers. SELCO operates in Karnataka, but other states 
lack a local analog to SELCO. 
3.2.2.4 Crowd-Sourced Funding 
With the rise of organizations like Kiva, which allows anyone in the world to make small 
loans to individuals in developing countries over the Internet, there has been a movement in crowd-
sourced funding for initiatives at the Bottom of the Pyramid. New social impact technology 
distributors have taken advantage of philanthropy by setting up organizations that get their money 
from everyday donors, not huge foundations, grants, or governments.  
Crowd-sourced funding for technology can be strictly charity. One organization that is 
known on the Boston scene is Kopernik, a nonprofit organization that is “an on-line marketplace of 
innovative, life-changing technologies designed for the developing world” (Kopernik, 2012). The 
organization’s website showcases about 40 of the latest technologies, and nongovernmental 
organizations choose which technologies are useful for their geographical areas. The NGOs apply 
online for funding, and Kopernik vets the request and posts it to the website. Donors can choose 
which projects to fund, and total funding for a project is around US$5,000. When funding is 
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complete, Kopernik ships the products directly to the NGO. The NGO sells the products at a 
highly subsidized rate to its clients, and this money returns to Kopernik to be reinvested into more 
projects. Finally, the NGO writes a report about how the technology is being used, and this report is 
made available to the donor. 
Crowd-sourced online funding is also used to fund loans for the purchase of technological 
innovations for development. This is how Milaap, an MFI, funds its end users. Milaap uses crowd-
sourced funding to fund individual borrowers for more expensive ticket items that range from 
US$100 to US$1,000. This includes larger technologies like entire solar home energy systems and 
entrepreneurial pursuits like the sales of smaller solar lanterns and smokeless cookstoves. After these 
loans are funded, field partners disburse them to individual borrows and collect repayments at 12 to 
18 percent to their and Milaap’s operational costs. Milaap makes monthly deposits of the repaid loan 
installments into the donor’s Milaap account, and at the end of the loan cycle the donor can choose 
to withdraw the repaid loan amount or relend it to another borrower (Milaap, 2012). 
Finally, online donors can support the distribution of technological innovations through the 
consumption of products that are made in rural areas. This fills the supply chain gaps both into and 
out of villages. Boond, a distributor of technologies like solar lanterns, water filters, and mosquito 
nets, uses this model. Online Boond supporters buy handicrafts made by rural artisans at market 
price (e.g. jewelry and bags), and this money pays for the upfront costs of manufacturing and 
transport of technological innovations to rural entrepreneurs. Rural entrepreneurs sell the 
technologies to end users and collect small, low-interest installments. Boond emphasizes that this 
process is not charity, as online donors purchase a handmade product and can get their money back 
in one year if dissatisfied or if desired (Boond, 2012). 
In these examples, crowd-source funding has been used as charity, microloans, and seed 
funding through the purchase of rural-produced goods. They are similar in that they all rely on the 
mercies of people donating their own money. Kopernik and Milaap operate on a project basis, 
which begs questions about scalability, financial sustainability, and long-term maintenance. Boond 
operates on a revolving basis, and its model is well thought. However, its operations are overly 
complex, which may lessen the involved players’ profit margins. 
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3.2.2.5 Rentals  
Finally, daily rentals are another way to make technologies available to end users at an 
affordable price. This can only apply to certain technologies, though – it does not make sense to rent 
out a cookstove to housewives, but it does make sense to rent out solar lanterns to street vendors.  
SELCO realized this and began identifying entrepreneurs to invest in solar lanterns that 
could be rented out daily to street vendors. These entrepreneurs were able to provide doorstep 
financing and doorstep service to street vendors, a group of people generally ignored by traditional 
banking. The same model has been applied to renting out solar headlamps for midwives or flower 
pickers on a daily or hourly basis. Harish Hande, Managing Director of SELCO, recounts this case:  
“This guy (the entrepreneur) in Hasan started with 30 lamps and put the solar 
charging station on the roof of his house that would charge the batteries used in 
these lamps. He would charge the batteries daily and rent the lamps to the vendors at 
5:30 pm. Then around 9:30-10:00 pm, he would collect the lamps back and INR 12 
per lamp that was rented out. The vendors this way would save INR 2-3 per day 
since they were earlier paying INR 15 to buy kerosene. Soon he purchased another 
30 and then another lot of 30.” (Mukherji, 2011) 
In 2011, SELCO Incubation Lab, which falls under the organization’s nonprofit arm, began 
experimenting with its Solar Energy Center. The Solar Energy Center is a solar charging and clean 
Figures 4a & Figures 4b: SELCO's Solar Energy Center in Dharmasthala 
offers solar lantern rentals and mobile phone charging. (Photos by the author.) 
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water demonstration center. One is located in a low-income area of Bangalore, and another is 
located in Dharmasthala, which is in rural western Karnataka. Inside the energy center, which is 
right now a used shipping container, entrepreneurs rent out solar lanterns and batteries. They also 
offer to charge mobile phones for Rs. 5 (US$0.10). Drinking water is filtered and offered for free.  
3.2.2.6 Thoughts: The Quality-Cost Trade-off, Financing Partnerships, and Technology-
Based Financing 
The previous examples are just a handful of strategies that SMEs are financing social impact 
technologies in India. Some of the most successful examples depend on SME partnerships with 
financial institutions, not the capabilities of the SMEs themselves. Other unmentioned examples 
include subsidies provided by government programs or bulk sales to institutions. 
One takeaway point is this decision between designing mediocre-quality, affordable 
technologies and providing financing for better, more expensive technologies. This is the difference 
between a solar lantern, which can sometimes be purchased in cash upfront, and a solar home 
energy system, which requires some type of financing. To a rural end user, solar lanterns are more 
affordable, but solar home lighting systems are more powerful, more robust, and more aspired 
toward. To an SME, a solar lantern is easier to sell, since financing schemes can be risky. 
Another takeaway point is that new technology, like that created by Simpa Networks, has the 
potential to radically change financing for technologies in rural areas. At the moment, though, it only 
works for solar home energy systems. Mobile phone-based money transfer services also have the 
potential to shake up this realm. These financial services are successful in places like Kenya and the 
Philippines, but tight regulations and the lack of a business model have made take-up difficult 
elsewhere. At the moment, there is no successful, widely used operator in India. 
3.2.3  Distr ibut ion 
In addition to innovating marketing and financing strategies, SMEs have to consider how to 
cost-effectively make their products physically available in rural areas. Some SMEs organize 
proprietary distribution channels to sell directly to end users. Others work through the traditional 
trade network or through small rural distributors whose social mission is to commercialize 
technologies for development. Still others establish institutional partnerships with organizations that 
have pre-existing relationships at the BOP. 
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3.2.3.1 Piggybacking on Existing Rural Networks 
Networks that snake through India’s rural areas currently exist. They include the existing 
rural trade network, the national postal service, Coca Cola distribution lines, and milkman routes 
that could be potential distribution channels for social impact technologies. 
The rural trade network seems to be the most obvious to piggyback on, as rural stores are 
already physically and technically capable of storing and selling products. Companies like Envirofit 
and d.light have attempted to sell their cookstoves and solar lanterns through the traditional rural 
retail network of distributors and shops. However, they faced obstacles of demand generation and 
after-sales service. Shop owners have limited space and a limited attention span. They must attend to 
customers’ quick and immediate needs, and when they push a product they feel like they are 
ignoring their other customers. As previously explained, mass advertising can be expensive for an 
SME to pursue. The consequence of no demand generation is that the technology ends up sitting on 
the shelf. This is particularly harmful in the case of solar lanterns, which lose charge over time. 
When a customers finally shows interest in a now discharged lantern, she thinks that all lanterns are 
poor quality. The product then gets pushed to the back of the shelf. Additionally, after-sales service 
is rarely available to retail shop owners. Retail shop owners will not invest in a product if they 
believe the quality is bad because they do not want to deal with customers’ returns. 
Godrej has attempted to sell its Chotukool, a US$69 low-energy refrigerator, through India 
Post, the national postal service. Since Chotukool requires demonstrations, the company did not 
want to distribute through the rural trade network. As part of their four-district pilot, kiosks were set 
up in post offices for demonstrations. Orders were booked through the post office, and paid for 
through the post office’s e-payment system. A postal van arrived with the product in one week 
(Jugaad to Innovation, 2011). Although it is innovative, the impact of using the postal service as a 
distribution network is yet to be seen. At least, the Chotukool does not seem to be reaching its 
expected target market of India’s emerging middle households. According to Hari Nair, Vice 
President at Innosight, a consulting firm to Godrej, most of Chotukool’s buyers are small retail shop 
owners.  
There are still other attempts to piggyback on existing rural networks. Multi Commodity 
Exchange of India Limited (MCX) started Gramin Suvidha Kendra (GSK) to bring futures 
information to farmers through the postal service’s hub and spoke model. Local youths staff rural 
post office branches, which are equipped with office equipment and an Internet connection to get 
updates on latest futures information. In 2007, GSK expanded its offerings to include seeds, water 
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purifiers, micronutrients, and solar lanterns. ColaLife is a company that wants to distribute social 
goods like oral rehydration salts, high-dose vitamin A, and water purification tablets to rural India 
through AidPods. AidPods are wedge-shaped containers that fit between Coca Cola bottles in their 
crates, taking advantage of the wide distribution network that reaches into India’s rural hinterland 
(Callard, 2011). Finally, Drishtee identifies and creates “milkman routes” that connect 20 to 25 
villages in a given rural district. Along this route, Drishtee creates a rural supply chain network to sell 
products and services (Drishtee, 2012). 
3.2.3.2 Rural Retail Shops/Local Centers 
Since selling through existing rural retail 
stores has been difficult, some SMEs have tried 
establishing their own shops. This is the case for 
Villgro Stores, a for-profit enterprise that is 
building a chain of decentralized, brick-and-
mortar stores in rural Tamil Nadu. In 2010, most 
of Villgro Stores’ 45 offerings were agricultural, 
but others fall into the categories of animal 
husbandry (e.g. animal feed), energy (e.g. 
cookstoves), water, and personal care (e.g. 
affordable reading glasses). Villgro Stores’ flagship field office is located in Gobi, and 10 Villgro 
Stores are located with 15 km of the head office. Each Villgro Store has three staff members and 
five to six village level entrepreneurs, a door-to-door salesman who source products from Villgro 
Stores and extend them into rural areas that are within eight kilometers of the store. In essence, the 
store serves as a hub for the village level entrepreneurs (Jue et al, 2011).  
Some companies choose not establish a brick-and-mortar store, but rather establish a brick-
and-mortar rural branch or local center to sell and service its technologies at the rural level. As of 
July 2010, SELCO had 23 branches in the state of Karnataka. These branches are located in far-off 
rural areas, which gives end users direct access to SELCO employees. Take, for example, the Puttur 
branch, which is located about an hour away from SELCO Incubation Lab in rural western 
Karnataka. The branch has been operating for the past 15 years, and there are six people working 
there. The branch employees take care of both new sales and after-sales service for installed systems. 
Figure 5: Villgro Store in Gobichettipalayam.  
(Photo by the author.) 
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Its technicians install three to four new lighting systems each month and provide service for about 
4,000 solar systems in Puttur’s catchment area. 
Although it makes sense to have a rural presence and space to store inventory, maintaining a 
store, paying rent, and hiring staff to man it are additional costs that must be covered. 
3.2.3.3 Rural Entrepreneurs 
Using “rural entrepreneurs” or “village level entrepreneurs” (VLEs) is by far the most 
common way for SMEs to distribute their social impact technologies. Rural entrepreneurs are both 
used as a proprietary distribution channel and the main distribution channel for small-scale 
aggregators. One reason for the overabundance of these Avon-style salespeople is possibly because 
SMEs are copying Hindustan Unilever’s Project Shakti initiative. This could be a poor idea in the 
long run; Project Shakti is only financially feasible for a company blessed with nearly unlimited 
wealth and patience.  
Villgro Stores has over 40 village level entrepreneurs, and they are so important to the 
organization that they are called “sales and change agents.” Compared with traditional retailers who 
sell from stores in town, VLEs are advantageous because they have personal connections with 
customers, know farming (and hence their agricultural products), physically bring products to end 
users at their farms, and provide services like training. VLEs also bear the economic risks of going 
the last mile. They purchase products from their associated Villgro Store, store the goods at their 
own premises, and slowly distribute the goods to their 60 to 100 customers. If a customer fails to 
pay, VLEs shoulder the burden. An average VLE sells about Rs. 40,000 (US$800) of products each 
month. He is paid through a monthly profit-sharing model, profiting about Rs. 2,000 to 3,000 
(US$40 to $60) (Jue et al., 2011). 
Greenlight Planet (GLP) began its Direct-to-Village (DTV) model in 2008, which relies 
heavily on rural entrepreneurs. When GLP enters a village, it creates awareness until at least one 
person buys its lantern at market price. This first buyer typically becomes the village’s go-to solar 
lantern person, and GLP offers him the opportunity to become its spokesperson and sell lanterns to 
other villagers. As a saathi (which means “friend” or “partner”), he earns a commission on sales. As 
a member of the Greenlight Planet Saathi Network, the saathi does not have to pay any upfront 
fees, make any initial investments, and does not have to quit his job. His investment is limited to 
purchasing a small quantity of products to resell to his community members. All saathis are working 
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for GLP on the side, but the top 30 percent of salesmen make more revenues selling solar lanterns 
than through their day jobs (Planete d’Entrepreneurs, 2010). 
Rural entrepreneurs often come from partnerships between manufacturing SMEs and 
NGOs/self help groups (SHGs). For example, the field staff members of ONergy’s rural energy 
centers train rural entrepreneurs made available through local NGOs. On commission, these rural 
entrepreneurs advertise ONergy’s energy solutions to the NGOs’ other clients. ONergy’s field staff 
provides installation and after-sales service. SHGs similarly provide rural entrepreneurs. SHGs are 
groups of 10 to 15 women who voluntarily come together to save regular amounts of money 
individually while contributing to a common fund. In a different example, Adharam Energy Private 
Limited identifies potential rural entrepreneurs through SHGs. These women give live 
demonstrations of First Energy Oorja cookstoves and sell them door-to-door by collecting monthly 
intents of purchase from customers (Kumaresh, 2010). This distribution channel has been widened 
to sell other products, such as groceries and soaps. HUL also identifies its Shakti ladies through 
SHGs. 
Small social impact technology aggregators like Sakhi Retail and the Shell Foundation-
supported Project Dharma also use rural entrepreneurs as their primary distribution channels. 
Although rural entrepreneurs can reach India’s hinterland, they can become difficult to work with if 
improperly incentivized. Finding quality rural entrepreneurs is not an easy feat. Through my field 
visit with RENE, I watched as rural entrepreneurs failed to show up at meetings and failed to collect 
payments on time. I have heard stories of rural entrepreneurs who stop selling in the middle of the 
month because they are already satisfied with their level of sales. A single rural entrepreneur can only 
reach a limited number of customers, so achieving scale on the order of millions of customers would 
require identifying tens of thousands of high-quality rural entrepreneurs. In short, scaling up 
distribution through rural entrepreneurs is hard. 
3.2.3.4 Piggybacking on Existing SMEs 
If an SME manages to be somewhat successful at its core competencies, it can become a 
platform for other technologies. This is what has happened with SELCO, which began expanding its 
catalogue  to include other energy technologies like cookstoves. SELCO recently partnered with 
Prakti Design, a relatively young enterprise based in Pondicherry, Tamil Nadu, to distribute its 
biomass cookstoves. The Prakti cookstoves would be co-branded as SELCO cookstoves and sell for 
Rs. 800 (US$16) and Rs. 1300 (US$26), depending on the model (Biswal, 2010). 
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Similarly, Envirofit began selling lighting 
solutions, including a hand-cranked LED 
flashlight. In addition to providing light in non-
electrified rural areas, the small flashlight boxes fit 
into the gaps of Envirofit’s shipping containers. 
Thus, they make every shipment more profitable. 
The main difficulty with using an existing 
SME’s distribution network is that its sales agents 
may be unaccustomed to selling a different 
technology, or the existing distribution channel 
for one technology is not appropriate for another type of technology. Even after two years, SELCO 
sales agents have not figured out the best way to sell cookstoves.  
3.2.3.5 Thoughts: If You Generate Demand for Technologies and Make them Affordable, 
Technologies Will Get to Customers 
The previous examples are the primary models that SMEs use to distribute social impact 
technologies into India’s hinterland. Other rural distribution-related examples include business-to-
business sales, which Envirofit switched to after working through the rural trade network, 
distribution with fast moving consumable goods (FMCGs) distributors, and new technologies that 
ease distribution logistics. Envirofit’s business-to-business sales now include deals with local 
governments, large corporations, and the state-level forest departments (Joshi, 2011). United 
Villages, an MIT alumnus-founded company that has established a distribution network for very 
rural stores in the state of Rajasthan, has shown interest in moving social impact technologies 
through its FMCG network. And another MIT alumnus-founded company, Logistimo, has 
developed mobile phone software to support rural distribution and supply chain management. 
One important lesson from these examples is that a distribution channel is just a channel. 
Many products already make their way into rural India without a unique distribution process. The 
two main differences between these products and social impact technologies are that they are in high 
demand and they are financially accessible (e.g. mobile phones and Coca Cola). Therefore, SMEs 
should establish marketing and financing first and then choose a distribution channel that makes 
sense for them. It would be unwise to invest in a fleet of vans or motorbikes to move social impact 
technologies without ensuring that they have paying customers. 
Figure 6: A Prakti cookstove that is co-branded under 
SELCO. (Photo taken by the author.) 
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Lastly, any innovations in the physical distribution of goods must be radically different than 
what is currently being practiced. One potential innovation is crowd-sourced delivery, which is a 
concept that has been experimented with by courier companies like DHL. However, translating that 
model to a rural setting with limited technological capabilities carries a lot of risk. 
3.2.4  After-Sales  Serv i ce  
When an SME sells a social impact technology but does not provide after-sales service, it 
actually negates the technology’s potential benefit to end users. Broken technologies take advantage 
of poor end users’ already limited budgets, and they become village litter. This is one reason why the 
selling into the BOP has been criticized: companies seek to sell products, which end up breaking, 
instead of providing long-term solutions, which last. 
Providing after-sales service is expensive at the BOP, where there are few trained technicians 
and a limited widespread availability of spare parts. However, after-sales service is important because 
it maintains long-term benefits to end users and an SME’s brand. 
3.2.4.1 Manufacturers’ Warranties 
Some of the lower-cost social impact technologies, like solar lanterns and cookstoves, come 
with manufacturers’ warranties. For example, the d.light S10 comes with a six-month warranty, and 
the more expensive d.light S250 comes with a one-year warranty. If needed, d.light will replace the 
lantern at no cost if the warranty is still valid, the warranty card is properly filled out, and the 
product seal is unbroken. When the six months to one year have passed, the rural entrepreneur or 
dealer that sold the lantern can order spare parts to repair the lantern – given that there is a local 
technician who knows how to do this (Ashden, 2010). Likewise, Greenlight Planet’s lanterns come 
with a one-year warranty, and Envirofit’s G-Series cookstove comes with a five-year warranty on the 
combustion chamber and a two-year warranty on all other components (Shell Foundation, 2012). 
The difficulty with warranties is making sure that end users keep and fill out their warranty 
cards. The rural end user or dealer/retailer needs to ensure that this happens. Other than through 
them, there are no ways to enforce the warranties.  
3.2.4.2 Service Centers 
Since its beginnings, SELCO has provided a service and not a product. In its mission to 
provide a holistic solution for rural lighting, after-sales service became a major activity. Now, there is 
a rural branch/service center within a 50 to 60 km radius of any Karnataka village. All of SELCO’s 
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solar home lighting systems are sold with a one-year service contract, which covers two panel and 
battery cleanings and one emergency call. Customers can buy an annual maintenance contract when 
this expires, or they can pay for service on a case-by-case basis. SELCO’s products also come with 
warranties; there is a three-year warranty for the battery, an eight-year warranty for the panel, and a 
one-year warranty for the light. The company will not sell anywhere where it cannot provide service 
within 24 hours. (CSTS/Ayllu Energy Map, 2011) 
According to SELCO’s Manager of Innovations, the actual servicing is very simple. During 
the first year of free servicing, the technicians can instruct households on basic maintenance (Biswal, 
2010). For example, the systems’ most common problem can be fixed by simply filling the battery 
with distilled water. However, despite the simple repairs, providing service is expensive. Traveling to 
rural homes to check on the home lighting systems and transporting spare parts are huge costs to 
SELCO. 
3.2.4.3 Thoughts: A Necessary Cost with Room to Innovate through Aggregation 
Most companies only care about the initial sales, pocketing the cash immediately, and 
moving on to the next customer. Even among rural consumers, the mindset is one of buy, break, 
throw away, and buy again – a vicious, costly cycle. Providing high-quality service for geographically 
dispersed customers is expensive, and SMEs that want to serve the rural poor take on after-sales 
service as an additional cost that aligns with their social mission. 
Some designers and manufacturers have thought about after-sales service in alternative ways. 
Those with a foot in the AT movement advocate for transparent design that is simple to understand, 
easy to fix in rural areas, and does not require fancy parts. However, more recent technological 
innovations for development have taken advantage of high-tech solutions, such as solar lighting 
panels and patent-pending combustion chambers. It would be unfair to deny low-income end users 
of these great technologies. Additionally, after-sales service helps brand these technologies as high-
quality, aspirational products. 
The costs of customer acquisition can be lowered through aggregation, and the same idea 
can be applied to the costs of after-sales service. This may look like service centers with technicians 
who can fix multiple technologies and a small stock of spare parts for a variety of technologies. The 
technology manufacturers can train the technicians, and customers can pay for a customer 
protection plan or on a per-repair basis. 
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3.3 Thoughts: Assessing SMEs’ Current Technology Dissemination Efforts 
As evidenced from this short list of examples, SMEs are experimenting with many different 
business models and strategies for social impact technology dissemination in rural India. No 
company has figured out the perfect dissemination model. I have never heard of any technology-
based SME disseminating more than 400,000 quantities of their particular product, even though 
there are millions upon millions of households to reach. Since this is the case, I have the following 
thoughts about SMEs and social impact technology dissemination: 
• Proprietary distribution channels are too expensive to establish and 
operate. Social impact technology manufacturers should focus on their core 
competencies: technology design and manufacturing. Their funds are already 
limited, and it is better to stick what they are best at doing instead of thinly 
spreading their resources over multiple activities.  
• Manufacturers should establish partnerships with like-minded 
organizations to cover non-core tasks. This could mean partnering with 
financial institutions to provide credit for end users or handing off distribution 
altogether. Partnerships allow organizations to utilize their comparative 
advantages to the fullest and improve upon their core competencies. It is best to 
keep operations simple. 
• SMEs’ relationships with the BOP should be built on mutually dependent 
building/economic development. MNCs built the wrong types of 
relationships at the BOP, why their business models for dissemination failed. 
Whereas MNCs used NGO or SHG staff as intermediaries between them and 
their customers, successful SMEs embed themselves in the local context and 
grow their businesses hand-in-hand with their BOP customers. The SMEs need 
the BOP, and the BOP need the SMEs. This is a mutually beneficial relationship. 
• Technologies should be aggregated to lower dissemination costs. This is 
particularly true for lowering the costs of customer acquisition and lowering the 
costs of after-sales service. Information and communication technologies can 
enable training for both marketing and after-sales service. 
• Marketing and financing must be established before physical distribution 
channels. Unless an SME comes across a radically innovative way to distribute 
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products, it should focus on demand generation and making its technologies 
affordable to end users. Once the products are pull products versus push 
products, then distribution channels are easier to establish and effective models 
exist that can be replicated.  
• Avon-style, door-to-door rural entrepreneurs are not scalable. Many SMEs 
are defaulting to using rural entrepreneurs to sell their technology. However, 
rural entrepreneurs are not a scalable solution. It is difficult to properly 
incentivize and accurately identify high-quality entrepreneurs. 
• SMEs should use enabling technologies where possible to lower 
transactions costs. This includes mobile phone software that eases supply chain 
logistics and mobile phone payments. 
• Scale is essential to attain to become financially viable, but financing is 
required to achieve scale. This is a classic chicken-egg problem, and it is due to 
the ecosystems that incentivize and support SMEs. Innovation-based 
competitions award very small pots of funding of US$5,000 to US$100,000. 
Most BOP financial projections rely on rapid scale to break even within a 
reasonable amount of time, but to reach this scale, SMEs need upwards of a few 
millions of dollars. There is a huge financing gap that no one – not even the 
social impact investors – is filling. And unfortunately, social enterprises do not 
look particularly appealing to commercial investors. 
All of these were issues that I had in mind when embarking upon Essmart. I cannot say that 
we have fully addressed every concern listed here, but we did our best to create a new business 
model for social impact technology dissemination that is both scalable and financially sustainable at 
the Bottom of the Pyramid.  
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4 Essmart: Giving Rural Retail Shop Owners Access to Products 
that Improve Their Customers’ Lives 
After conducting my first round of field research in India, I returned to MIT with a lot to 
think about. Technology dissemination was the biggest barrier to innovation-for-development, not 
technology design. No company, big or small, had figured out how to reach individuals at the 
Bottom of the Pyramid as either customers or beneficiaries of technological innovations. It was not 
to point out the problems that I saw in each model. For me, a more interesting – and perhaps more 
impactful – project was to address some of these issues through a different model for technology 
dissemination at the BOP. 
In October 2011, my journey with Essmart began. Essmart is a for-profit technology 
distributor that gives rural retail shops access to technologies that improve their customers’ lives. 
Our work will begin in the third-tier southern Indian city of Pollachi, Tamil Nadu. Essmart’s 
business model is based on the research and experiences that my Co-Founder, Jackie Stenson, and I 
acquired in the field. Like me, Jackie’s original interest in technology for development was born in 
MIT’s D-Lab. As an engineer trained at Harvard, she wanted to be a technology designer. But after 
spending two years in Africa working for technology-based organizations, Jackie also saw that 
dissemination of technologies was a bigger problem than their invention. She pursued her Master’s 
degree at the University of Cambridge, focusing on rural sales, marketing, and distribution strategies 
in Eastern Africa. 
Over the course of eight months, Jackie and I have worked through multiple iterations of 
Essmart’s business model, assembled a team, reached out to advisors, applied for funding, surveyed 
and piloted in India, wrote business plans, given pitches, and competed in competitions. The 
experience has taught me much about Boston’s innovation-for-development ecosystem, which 
before I had only observed as an outsider. Because of Essmart, I had the opportunity to go through 
the social entrepreneurship pipeline, taking advantage of the resources provided by this local 
ecosystem. This network of supporters and funders continues to propel Essmart forward on the US 
side, through money and through public recognition, which we hope will be beneficial in the long 
run. 
Despite the recent positive feedback in the US, I recognize that our true measure of success 
is found on the ground, where we must match the momentum that we experience here. We will 
return to the field this summer to continue what I believe is most important for us, as non-Indians 
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working in rural India: building relationships with our partners working at the Bottom of the 
Pyramid and strengthening our relationships with our India-based team. 
4.1 Essmart: Company Overview 
4.1.1  Problem: Disconnec t  Between Essent ia l  Technology Manufacturers  and Rural  
Retai l  Shops 
The technology manufacturer d.light, based in Delhi, northern India, designs high quality 
solar lights that cost on average US$15 and are sold to low-income customers in rural, off-grid areas. 
d.light‘s exclusive use of door-to-door salesmen has failed to achieve their desired market 
penetration and social impact. As most of their human and financial resources are invested in 
product design and manufacturing instead of distribution, it is difficult for d.light to independently 
overcome the fragmented distribution lines that snake across the nation. Similar to d.light, there are 
hundreds of organizations that make essential life-improving technologies but struggle to ratchet up 
their scale and grow their customer base. 
Meanwhile, 1,500 miles away in Pollachi, Tamil Nadu, Southern India, Javid owns a 400 
square meter shop on a main road with 10 other local retail shops. His shelves are crammed full with 
Coke bottles, toiletries and other consumable goods. Javid’s store gives him a yearly profit of 
US$2,500, and every week he spends 
minimum US$5 and nearly a full day 
traveling to Coimbatore to restock his 
shelves. His customers are local farming 
households that spend US$1,000 on retail 
per year. Javid is looking for ways to 
distinguish his business from local 
competition and increase his income. 
There are 14 million shop owners like 
Javid in India, and for 90 percent of 
India’s population, these local retail shops 
are their lifeline to consumer products.  
Figure 7: There exists a gap in the global supply chain between technology 
retailers and local retail shops. 
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There is a gap between d.light and Javid – a rift between the suppliers of essential 
technologies and local retail shops that could sell their products. Javid does not know about these 
essential technologies, where to find them, or how to service them. Essmart offers a solution. 
Essmart delivers the goods.  
4.1.2  Solut ion:  Essmart  Bridges  the Technology Gap 
Essmart is an essential technology 
distributor with an embedded retail presence in 
India’s rural shops, beginning in Pollachi, Tamil 
Nadu. Our model focuses on the marketing, 
distribution, and after-sales service gaps by 
combining process innovations that lower costs in 
rural areas. We reach end users through the 
extensive retail shop network that services local 
communities. 
Essmarts’ sales agents establish 
relationships with rural stores that carry our products, leveraging an existing network and trusted 
buying relationships. During the first three months after entering a village, our sales agents 
demonstrate and help retailers sell Essmart products at the rural retail store. This helps establish 
demand from end users and buy-in from the retail shop owner.  
After demand is established, Essmart switches to a traditional hub-and-spoke distribution 
model. Essmart incentivizes shop owners to stock our catalogue and demonstration products 
through opportunities to differentiate themselves, higher profit margins, and skills training.  
Within stores that are typically smaller than 500 square feet, shop owners keep a catalogue 
and demonstration products in an Essmart-branded section. End users flip through Essmart’s 
catalogue and try out demonstration products. When an end user wants to purchase an Essmart 
technology, she notifies the shop owner. The shop owner then places the order with Essmart via 
mobile phone. This “virtual inventory” is appropriate for rural shop owners who can spare little 
room in their shops, and it minimizes Essmart’s inventory and risk. 
Essmart then purchases products in bulk from suppliers, who ship the products to our 
centralized storage facility in the town nearest to the rural retailers. Shop owners can pick up 
Figure 8: Where Essmart fills the gaps. 
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products at this facility, since they already travel to the city to procure other goods. Alternatively, we 
can transport the products to rural stores via truck or motorbike.  
If a product breaks, end users can bring it back to the rural shop where it was purchased. 
The shop owner notifies Essmart of the broken product, and on the next delivery cycle we deliver a 
new product and take the broken product. We are able to deliver the new product by facilitating 
manufacturers’ warranties, which come with all of the technologies that are in our catalogue. 
4.1.3  Market Analys is :  Huge Potent ia l  at  the Bottom of  the Pyramid  
India has an estimated 14 million mom-and-pop retail shops that reach the farthest-flung, 
rural interior. These local retail shops stock a limited selection of mostly fast moving consumer 
goods and maintain tight community relationships. They are the portal of commerce for this market 
segment, as they are the only places where 90 percent of India’s 1.2 billion citizens – about 192 
million households – purchase all of their goods. According to a report by Corporate Catalyst India, 
retail is one of India’s fastest growing sectors, with an annual growth rate of about 46 percent. 
Unorganized retail, which primarily consists of local retail shops, is the largest source of employment 
after agriculture and has deep penetration into rural India. They generate more than 10 percent of 
India’s GDP. 
The National Council of Applied Economic Research, India splits rural retail shops’ 
customers into two segments: Aspirer (annual income of US$2,000 to US$4,000; typically small shop 
keepers, farmers, and low-skilled workers in industry and services) and Deprived (annual income of 
less than US$2,000; typically low-skilled to 
unskilled workers, seasonal or part-time 
employees). According to Indicus 
Analytics, rural households spend about 8 
percent of their income on fuel and light 
and 3 percent of their income on durables. 
Essmart distributes technologies that are 
designed for these households and fall 
into these categories. With prices between 
US$10 and US$30, Essmart’s technologies 
fit within rural households’ current 
budgets. 
Figure 9: India's consumer pyramid (Mathur, 2011). 
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4.1.4  Compet i t ive  Analys i s  and Advantage :  Essent ia l  Technology Retai l ing through 
Local  Rural  Shops 
Most competitors in rural distribution push fast moving consumer goods (FMCGs), focus 
on a specific technology sector, use or use door-to-door village level entrepreneurs (VLEs), or work 
through nongovernmental organizations for distribution. Unlike Essmart, none of these is a scalable 
or holistic option for making essential technologies available in rural communities. Compared to 
these competitors, Essmart has multiple competitive advantages: 
1. Essmart is scalable. We leverage an existing network of small business owners 
who already have tight connections with rural communities.  
2. Essmart is specialized. We focus on technology dissemination, as opposed to 
manufacturers whose core competencies are in design and manufacturing.  
3. Essmart aggregates many existing essential technologies. This lowers the 
cost of customer acquisition, appeals to a wider customer base, utilizes scope to 
minimize saturation, and gives end users a choice of brands for different product 
types.  
4. Essmart has internal knowledge about essential technologies. This gives us 
the ability to manage our risks by selecting high-quality products.  
5. Essmart has connections with technology designers in the US and in other 
countries. This gives us access to innovative products before other distributors 
know about them.  
4.1.5  Socia l  Impact  Indicators ,  Measurement ,  and Five-Year Pro jec t ions 
Essmart has three main goals: 1) To make essential, life-improving technologies available to 
rural Indian households, 2) To create a sustainable and scalable distribution model for essential 
technologies, and 3) To bring new, innovative essential technologies out of the labs and into the 
land. 
Essmart’s social impact indicators focus on achieving our first two missions. Indicators for 
achieving our third mission will be developed once distribution channels are established and we start 
expanding our catalogue. Our current social impact indicators are: 
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1. Number of products sold (indicative of reach): This indicator directly 
measures the number of end users that are accessing and therefore benefiting 
from Essmart’s catalogue. Each Essmart product has its own social value 
proposition, and each product sold improves the lives of an end user according 
to that product’s purpose.  
2. Number of Essmart retailers (indicative of scalability): This indicator 
directly measures the number of villages in which Essmart products are available 
and accessible to end users. 
3. Economic improvement of retail shops (indicative of lift): This is measured 
by comparing a shop’s average monthly profits before and after becoming an 
Essmart retailer. Essmart relies on its customers, local retail shops, to make 
essential technologies available. One of Essmart’s key value propositions for 
shops is economic improvement. This both improves the lives of Essmart’s 
customers and also ensures Essmart’s customer base. 
 
Table 1: Five-year project of Essmart’s key social impact metrics. 
Essmart’s Key Metrics 
  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Aggregate Facilities 1 9 23 43 71 
Products Sold 2,300 105,395 660,445 2,034,050 4,415,200 
      
Retailers Covered 65 1,305 4,500 10,180 18,575 
Total Additional Retail Revenue 6 253 1,585 4,882 10,596 
Per Retailer Revenue Increase ($s) 106 400 580 689 757 
Per Retailer Revenue Increase % 4.2%  16.0%  23.2%  27.6%  30.3%  
Projections are based on Essmart’s analysis and assumptions. Revenue increases are calculated based on Essmart’s profit 
margins and an assumed US$2,500 annual income based on January 2012 survey results.  
4.1.6  Financia l  Plan 
Essmart expects three revenue streams, with the later two developing after our distribution 
infrastructure takes place: 
1. Sales of essential technologies: Products are purchased from manufacturers at 
a bulk discounts. Essmart sells to retailer shop owners at ~20 percent mark up, 
who then sell to end users at ~20 percent mark up. In our January 2012 pilot, 
shop owners received an eight percent margin and were satisfied with this 
amount, so we assume a 20 percent mark up (or even something slightly lower) 
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to be more than sufficient. For a product that retails to end users at US$15, 
Essmart keeps US$2 to cover costs and generate profits.  
2. Last-mile transportation for products: Currently, many shop owners travel to 
the nearest city to pick up most of their goods, and they have expressed an 
interest in purchasing more expensive goods from urban centers. Shop owners 
can therefore pick up essential technology orders from Essmart’s nearest city 
warehouse, or we can provide delivery to their rural shop for a small fee. 
3. Sales of rural market data to manufacturers and other interested 
organizations: Essmart will sell rural market data, including consumer 
preferences and technology failure reports, to manufacturers. This valuable 
information is currently not available, and our diverse technology catalogue and 
tracing of sales allows us to collect this data. 
The following table summarizes our economic growth and scale for the next five years. 
Based on this model, Essmart breaks even after year three (2014). It should be noted that our 
financial model currently only includes revenues from product sales.  
Table 2: Essmart’s pro-forma financial metrics. 
 
4.2 Essmart’s Rationale and Differences from Current Business Models for 
Dissemination 
Essmart’s business model is a distributorship+, with the + indicating demonstrations for 
demand generation and warranty facilitation to ensure long-term impact. From the viewpoint of 
someone in the US, Essmart’s operations are nothing new; we are basic our model on a standard 
hub-and-spoke distribution system, with a few additional changes. However, for people who know 
the extent of technology dissemination as a problem in developing countries, where most retail is 
still disorganized, Essmart’s technology dissemination process is noticeably different. Although 
distributors for social impact technologies currently exist, no one has aggregated multiple 
($000s)& 2012$ 2013$ 2014$ 2015$ 2016$
Revenue$ 28 1,353 9,074 29,902 69,449 
EBIDTA$ (57) (244) (610) 1,040 5,067 
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technologies, put them in a catalogue so shops could sell through virtual inventory, and enforced 
manufacturers’ warranties before. 
As mentioned earlier, Essmart is a response to the thoughts and concerns that I had about 
SMEs’ social impact technology dissemination efforts. In the following table, I summarize my 
original thoughts and describe how Essmart addresses each one. 
Table 3: Addressing social impact technology dissemination with Essmart. 
Concerns with SMEs’ Technology 
Dissemination Efforts 
How Essmart Addresses these Concerns 
• Proprietary distribution channels are too 
expensive to establish and operate.  
• Essmart fills in the distribution gap so that 
manufacturers do not have to. 
• Manufacturers should establish 
partnerships with like-minded 
organizations to cover non-core tasks. 
• Essmart takes on the tasks of demand 
generation, distribution, and guaranteeing 
that warranties are enforced. 
• SMEs’ relationships with the BOP should 
be built on mutually dependent 
building/economic development.  
• Essmart establishes these relationships 
with BOP retailers. 
• Technologies should be aggregated to 
lower dissemination costs.  
• Essmart aggregates technologies in its 
catalogue. 
• Marketing and financing must be 
established before physical distribution 
channels. 
• Essmart works with retailers to 
demonstrate technologies in their shops 
before switching to a hub-and-spoke 
model. 
• Avon-style, door-to-door rural 
entrepreneurs are not scalable. 
• Essmart does not use door-to-door rural 
entrepreneurs. 
• SMEs should use enabling technologies 
where possible to lower transactions costs. 
• Essmart uses mobile phone software to 
lower supply chain management costs 
(See 4.2.4). 
• Scale is essential to attain to become 
financially viable, but financing is required 
to achieve scale. 
• Essmart is seeking larger amounts of 
funding after the innovation-for-
development competitions. 
 
In addition to addressing my own concerns, I also want to address the concerns of others. 
The following are questions that people frequently ask us at networking events, pitching events, and 
competitions. I answer them to provide a rationale for Essmart’s business model and to demonstrate 
how we are different from current social impact technology dissemination efforts. 
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4.2.1  How Does Essmart Choose i t s  Technolog ies?  
We choose technologies based on a local area’s demand, our team’s internal knowledge of 
their quality (team members have experience working with these technologies and personal 
connections to technology innovators), their current availability in India (so as to avoid paying 
international shipping and import fees), and whether the technologies come with manufacturers’ 
warranties. 
Our partners, MIT’s D-Lab and the Cambridge-based Technology Exchange Lab (TEL), will 
also help us assess and select which technologies to include in our catalogue. As part of its new 
Technology Dissemination Program, D-Lab has been developing assessment metrics for different 
social impact technologies. This information will be useful for us to determine which solar lantern is 
built best for the local conditions, although we also plan to offer multiple models in our catalogue to 
get market-based feedback. TEL is a nonprofit organization that provides an online platform where 
the global community can share and discuss innovative, locally implemented solutions to problems 
of poverty and sustainability. The organization’s database gives Essmart knowledge about 
technologies that we may have otherwise not known about. We are also beginning discussions about 
Essmart-TEL technology demonstrations. 
4.2.2  Why is  Essmart  a Distr ibutor and not  a Retai l er?  
We choose to work with instead of against rural retail shops because we want to support 
rural entrepreneurs, whose revenues will increase by 30 percent in five years if they distribute 
Essmart’s products. This has macroeconomic effects on the nation, as India’s unorganized retail 
sector contributes to 10 percent of the nation’s GDP (Corporate Catalyst India, 2009). Additionally, 
we feel that it is easier to sell products through an existing relationship with rural end users than to 
create a brand new one. It is also easier for us to work with individuals who are also entrepreneurs, 
instead of having to train new entrepreneurs with business skills. This retail network already reaches 
all rural areas in some form, so our model will not be as difficult to scale as the door-to-door retail 
model, which requires identifying and training new entrepreneurs. 
Lastly, there are legal rules in India regarding foreign direct investment in multi-brand 
retailing. This is currently a hot topic in the political realm, as it is feared that big box stores like 
Walmart will displace mom-and-pop stores. The US Consulate in Kolkata stated that even US 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee discussed FDI 
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in multi-brand retailing during their May 2012 meeting (Mustafa, 2012). Currently, the Indian 
government does not allow FDI in multi-brand retailing. However, the industry is quickly changing. 
In November 2011, the Cabinet approved to open up India’s multi-brand retail sector to 51 percent, 
but there was so much opposition across multiple stakeholders that the decision was suspended and 
put on hold. The same November 2011 decision removed the 51 percent cap on FDI into single-
brand retail outlets (Press Trust of India, 2012). If Essmart eventually wants to open up retail stores, 
it would be beneficial to establish a rural brand as soon as possible to become first movers. 
4.2.3  How Does Essmart  Se le c t  i t s  Retai l ers?  
Even though there are 14 million rural retail stores in India, we do not want to distribute to 
every one. Our goal is to only work with entrepreneurial retailers who see the economic and social 
benefits of working with Essmart. Per village, there will only be one or two Essmart stores. We will 
identify them through surveys and word of mouth, as well as observations. More entrepreneurial 
retail shop owners will likely have a storefront with many product advertisements, for example. 
Harvard’s Center for International Development’s Entrepreneurial Finance Lab has been 
developing new screening technologies for entrepreneurs in low-income countries. These tools, 
which include psychometric testing (Entrepreneurial Finance Lab, 2012), could also be useful to 
Essmart for selecting retailers. 
Essmart is currently in discussion with the Sri Siddhanta Foundation (SSF) as a potential 
retail partner. SSF is a Chenai-based nonprofit organization that focuses on village development. Its 
recent initiative, Gramothan, includes chapters in Bangalore, Delhi, Calcutta, and Mumbai. 
Gramothan Resource Centers are located throughout India, in the states of Tamil Nadu, Jharkhand, 
Maharashtra, Orissa, West Bengal, and Uttar Pradesh. Managers within SSF are presently very 
interested in bringing essential technologies to villages, which is why the organization serves as a 
potential collaborator. Essmart would work with SSF to run product demonstration and to retail 
Essmart’s catalogue through their for-profit arm in their Gramothan Centers. In the future, we may 
seek to work with SSF to train rural youth for servicing broken technologies. 
4.2.4  How Does Essmart Lower Advert i s ing ,  Distr ibut ion,  and Transportat ion 
Costs?  
We recognize that these are real costs that are difficult to decrease in rural areas, especially 
when it comes to physically moving products. For advertising, we will be working with all of our 
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technology suppliers to train Essmart’s sales agents about the technology. This information will be 
stored in digital format (e.g. video) for sales agents to share with rural shop owners and end users. 
The manufacturers will also provide Essmart with publicity materials to hand out in shops. Because 
we aggregate technologies, it may be cost-effective for Essmart to run a television, radio, or 
newspaper advertisement since the cost of customer acquisition per technology is relatively low. 
For distribution, we are partnering with Logistimo, an MIT alumnus-founded company that 
develops mobile phone-based logistics software that can be applied to small retail outlets in India. 
Logistimo’s software will assist with placing orders, managing and tracking inventory, and reducing 
overall transaction costs with rural distribution. The software works on any Java-enabled phone, 
which is most of the phones in India. Essmart is exploring the potential of an exclusive contract 
with Logistimo for rural retailing.  
For transportation, we offer retailers the option of picking up technologies from the nearest-
city warehouse, since they already go there to purchase non-Essmart goods. We may also work with 
Logistimo to test a different type of transport scheme in the summer of 2012. 
4.2.5  How Does Essmart Manage i t s  Cash Flow?  
Distribution is risky because Essmart has to invest in inventory that may not sell. Having 
working capital tied up in inventory is a frightening prospect. Ultimately, the goal is to collect money 
from our shop owners before we have to pay back our suppliers. From our January 2012 surveys, we 
learned that distributors’ golden standard is 15 days of credit after delivery. Since we do not have a 
lot of working capital, we will attempt to incentivize shop owners to pay in full on delivery, or even 
a partial amount when shop owners place orders by mobile phone (although this payment will be 
logistically difficult to collect). Meanwhile, we are asking suppliers to give us 30 days of credit. Also, 
we are experimenting with different supply chain models and purchasing contracts to address this 
problem: 
• Pre-orders: This is the model that is described in our business plan. Retailers only 
keep a catalogue and demonstration products, which is helpful because they have 
limited space. After reading through the catalogue and testing the demonstration 
products, end users place orders with shopkeepers. Shopkeepers place orders 
with Essmart as they come in, and every set time period, Essmart places orders 
in bulk with suppliers. When the products reach the warehouse, they are sorted 
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and shipped to rural shops on a fixed schedule. Although end users will have to 
wait between one and two weeks for their goods, Essmart’s risk is minimized 
because we know that the inventory will sell. However, this model is only feasible 
when we are operating at scale, since we need to collect enough orders from 
retailers to place orders in bulk from suppliers. 
• Consignment: In this model, Essmart owns all of the goods until they are sold to 
end users. After they are sold to end users, the retailers pay Essmart and keep a 
cut of the profits. The consignment model removes the risk from retailers, who 
would then be more likely to experiment with selling them at first. However, it is 
incredibly risky to Essmart, who must invest in the inventory and will not earn 
money until the inventory is sold to end users. Additionally, the retailer has little 
incentive to push the product, and it is often shoved to the back of the shelf.  
• Retailer-owned: This is the standard distribution model in which retailers pay for 
and keep inventory in their shops. Essmart keeps inventory in a warehouse so 
that technologies can be shipped out on a fixed delivery schedule at a quantity 
defined by the retailer. In this model, retailers are incentivized to purchase a 
lower quantity of goods because they do not want to take on the risk. Essmart 
may have to negotiate buy-back contracts with them to increase their purchases. 
Essmart will be experimenting with different models beginning in the summer of 2012 and 
extending throughout the fall. The ultimate supply chain will likely combine different aspects of 
these models, and it will depend on end user demand for these technologies, actual locations of 
Essmart’s warehouse and the retail shops, actual transportation costs, willingness of retailers to pay 
on time, and willingness of suppliers to offer credit. We also recognize that we must be careful as we 
scale to more stores, more warehouses, and more products, since each of these moves will result in 
purchasing an as of yet unknown amount of inventory. 
4.2.6  Why is  Essmart  Start ing in a Per i-Urban Area,  as Opposed to a Rural  Area?  
Essmart is starting in a peri-urban area because technology adoption diffuses outward from 
urban areas. It only reaches commercial adoption in rural areas after it becomes popular in urban 
areas. This is something we learned in January 2012, when we talked with end users who felt more 
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comfortable purchasing expensive goods from upscale urban showrooms as opposed to very rural 
shops.  
Thus, we are beginning in Pollachi, Tamil Nadu, which is a third-tier city with a small urban 
center. Our warehouse will double as a showroom, and we will partner with a local retailer to sell our 
goods. Due to its better infrastructure and higher income levels, Tamil Nadu is an easier market to 
begin in. We hope to demonstrate successes early on before expanding to more challenging areas. 
4.2.7  What is  Essmart  Doing to  Finance End Users?  
During our January 2012 pilot, we worked with two retail shops to sell 17 items. These items 
sold out within one week, and there were no issues about products being too expensive. Thus, 
because of our target market, direct financing for low-income end users is not yet within the scope 
of Essmart’s activities.  
We recognize that in the future, we will have to partner with other institutions and 
organizations for financing. When we do make that transition, we plan to facilitate relationships 
between microfinance institutions or rural banks and rural shop owners, not end users. If rural shop 
owners have access to credit to invest in inventory or to offer credit to their customers, then they 
can support the sales of Essmart’s products to end users. 
We have come across individuals in the US who are developing financing schemes for end 
users that could be implemented through retail shops. These include a layaway scheme in which 
customers pay for durable items in installments and do not receive the goods until they are paid off 
in full. This is something that can be experimented with once Essmart lays its foundations as a 
distribution network, but it is not something that we plan to include in our core activities. 
4.2.8  Why is  Essmart  even Bother ing with Guarantees?  
It is inevitable that working technologies will fail. When a social impact technology fails, 
there can be consequences. First, the technology ceases to bring social benefits. Second, it sucks 
money out of a population that is already poor. Third, it becomes garbage – thrown out onto the 
road. I have seen improved cooking stoves sit broken in the corners of rural Indian kitchens. 
Fourth, it wrecks Essmart’s brand, shakes customer confidence, skews perceptions around new 
technologies, and distorts the market for new entrants. For example, I learned that solar lanterns are 
gaining a bad reputation in Chennai’s peri-urban areas because too many low-quality, quick-to-break 
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lanterns have been imported from China. If Essmart wants to sell higher-quality lanterns there, we 
will have difficulty convincing potential customers of their improvements. 
After-sales service is just as important as initial sales because it sustains the long-term impact 
and sales of social impact technologies. It also gives us an opportunity to interact with our 
technology end users, allowing Essmart to collect data on why technologies fail (e.g. user error or 
poor quality?) and creating a bi-directional learning experience (and monetized data) that we can 
pass on to our suppliers. This relationship will improve product design and quality and would be a 
huge improvement on the current situation.  
4.3 A Timeline of Essmart’s Progress in Boston’s Innovation-for-
Development Space 
Essmart’s current business model took over eight months to develop. It has received input 
from new teammates, advisors, surveys with rural retail shop owners, and a pilot that we ran on the 
ground in Pollachi, Tamil Nadu. The process of Essmart’s development from a vague idea to a more 
refined idea to an almost-funded reality has been simultaneously exciting, grueling, and rewarding. 
Much of our recent successes – that is, our recent competition wins – can be attributed to the 
support system that we were nurtured in.  
4.3.1  Fall  2011: Essmart ’ s  Beginnings 
Essmart began upon my first meeting with Jac kie 
in October 2011. Joost Bonsen, who teaches MIT D-
Lab’s Development Ventures and known on-campus 
connector, was the person who introduced us. After our 
first lunch meeting, Jackie and I spent the next few hours 
outlining what would become Essmart.  
Over the fall semester, Jackie and I worked on 
Essmart as part of our assignment for Development 
Ventures. We met regularly for office hours with Joost, 
who put us in touch people who had experience in rural India and retail. These included Fellows 
from the MIT Sloan School of Management and Kopernik, the nonprofit organization that 
disseminates technologies to local NGOs. We also began meeting with Saida Benhayoune, who had 
Figure 10: Essmart Co-Founders Jackie Stenson and 
Diana Jue. (Photo taken by the author.) 
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been recently hired to run MIT D-Lab’s Technology Dissemination Program. She put us in touch 
with others involved in rural distribution around the world, such as Living Goods in Africa and 
Hapinoy in the Philippines. In addition to phone calls and in-person meetings, Jackie and I attended 
the Legatum Convergence Conference, which coins itself as “the global forum on entrepreneurship 
in emerging markets.” It was there where we met the Technology Exchange Lab, who we are 
working with to select technologies. 
The fall semester was also our first attempt at raising money for a January 2012 (MIT’s 
Independent Activities Period, or IAP) trip to India. By mid-December, we had raised about 
US$8,500 from multiple sources to conduct research and test our model in the field. These cash 
awards were a MIT Public Service Center and MIT D-Lab IAP Fellowship, MIT International 
Development Initiative Technology Dissemination Fellowship, MIT Legatum Center IAP Seed 
Grant, MIT IDEAS Global Challenge Development Grant, and MIT Department of Urban Studies 
and Planning Emerson Award. Jackie also competed in the MIT $100K Elevator Pitch Competition. 
We made it to the finals with high marks from our first round judges, but we did not have the 
opportunity to pitch at the finals, in front of the large audience.  
Around this time, our team also grew. Jackie and I attended and/or pitched at networking 
events, like Venture Café (“place-based social networking for Boston’s start-up set”), MIT IDEAS 
Global Challenge Generator Dinner, and the Harvard Business School Business Plan Contest Social 
Venture Track Teambuilding Mixer. At the last event, an undergraduate from Harvard College and a 
graduate student from Tufts Fletcher School expressed their interest in Essmart. A graduate student 
from Harvard Kennedy School reached out to us on our MIT IDEAS Global Challenge profile 
page. These three students became members of our core team. 
4.3.2  January 2012: Essmart ’ s  Fie ld Work 
In January 2012, I traveled around India to learn more about rural distribution, meet with 
potential collaborators, connect with India’s development community, survey rural retail shop 
owners, and run a pilot in Pollachi. It was a jam-packed month that was also chronicled on the MIT 
Public Service Center blog. 
To learn more about rural distribution, I talked with other rural distributors and listened to 
insights from others who have experience in the field. United Villages, another MIT alumnus-
founded company, is distributing fast-moving consumable goods in villages around Jaipur. I visited 
its rural operations, which were impressive – the company is delivering basic goods to even the most 
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remote shops. Staff members at IIT Madras’ Centre for Social Innovation and Entrepreneurship 
(CSIE) gave me their thoughts on rural distribution of durable goods, which were formed through 
30 years of field experience. One of these staff members had worked for Villgro before moving to 
the CSIE, so he had been exposed to plenty of efforts that attempted to distribute technological 
innovations for the poor. Then I spoke with the CEO of Villgro Stores, who had worked with BP to 
distribute its Oorja cookstove. He spoke mostly about the design challenge, not the distribution 
challenge, and argued that financing was more important than distribution. 
I also had the opportunity to attend the Deshpande Foundation’s Development Dialogue 
(DD), which was held in Hubli, northern Karnataka. The Deshpande Foundation is headed by 
Gururaj Deshpande, who is a Life Member of the MIT Corporation, the Board of Trustees of MIT. 
I had met him at a poster conference in the fall, and he (and Joost Bonsen) put me in touch with 
Anup Akkihal, who founded Logistimo. Anup Akkihal secured me an invitation to DD, where I 
listened to and chatted with well-known Indian social entrepreneurs like SELCO’s Harish Hande 
and Mother Earth’s Neelam Chhiber. In general, it was a great networking session that led to 
contacts with the Sri Siddhanta Foundation and the Centre for Public Policy at the Indian Institute 
of Management Bangalore. 
Although it sounds rather unproductive, I spent a considerable amount of time talking with 
a number of other individuals and organizations that are actively involved in India’s innovation-for-
development space. These included social entrepreneurs 
from India and from abroad, university students who are 
deciding what career path to pursue, university professors 
who were roped into social entrepreneurship, and 
government organizations run out of universities.  
Finally, Essmart team members conducted our 
200 surveys and ran a pilot of our model with two retail 
shops. The surveys took place in different areas around 
southern India: rural northern Karnataka, rural western 
Karnataka, peri-urban Chennai, Tamil Nadu, and villages 
around Pollachi, southern Tamil Nadu. To conduct our 
surveys in western Karnataka, we worked with SELCO 
Incubation Labs, which is located at SDMIT in Ujire. Figure 11: Surveying shop owners in Pollachi.  
(Photo taken by author.) 
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Our Pollachi activities were completed with the help of four graduate students from NGM College. 
The pilot, which involved purchasing products, driving them down to Pollachi, and moving them 
into local shops, was a success. We worked with two entrepreneurial peri-urban shopkeepers to sell 
17 technologies in just one week. The items were given to shopkeepers on consignment, and the 
shopkeepers were very satisfied with keeping an eight percent margin – a percentage that is 
considerably lower than what we are planning to offer when we begin operations.  
 
Table 4: General findings from surveys in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, January 2012. 
General Findings: Northern Karnataka and Southern Tamil Nadu 
Villages surveyed: 
 
Tamil Nadu: Kinathukadava, Udumalpet, Samathur, Anamalai, 
Meenakshipuram, Thamaraikulam, Kovilpalayam, Govundapuram, 
Ganapathipalayam, and Odayanulam. 
 
Karnataka: Benakanal, Mallapur, Anegundi, Sanapur and Gangawati. 
Technology 
preference findings: 
Over 40 shop owners expressed interest in carrying our products or catalogue, 
especially solar lanterns. 
 
Demonstrations and good branding are essential for customer buy-in. 
 
Retailers prefer to purchase products over US$10 from a central Essmart 
showroom. This has motivated our decision to have a nearest-city service and 
demonstration center. 
Distribution findings: Retailers in villages generally purchased their products from bigger retail stores 
in urban centers 3 to 20 times a month. 
 
HUL’s Shakti Retail only had a presence in one village, demonstrating that the 
other rural villages still need to be tapped. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Essmart’s 
first pilot of 17 items 
in two Pollachi shops. 
(Photo taken by the 
author.) 
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4.3.3  Spring 2012: Essmart ’ s  Compet i t ion Season 
My return from India kicked off another round of team building and our first serious round 
of fundraising. Jackie and I participated in New Enterprises, a class offered by MIT Sloan’s Martin 
Trust Center for MIT Entrepreneurship. In that class, we met another Tufts Fletcher student and a 
MIT Sloan student, who had also heard us pitch at a D-Lab and a Sloan Entrepreneurs for 
International Development networking event. These two students became core members of our 
team, bringing our core team to eight people – definitely sizeable for start-up. 
For the spring of 2012, our goal was to raise as much money as possible to begin operations 
in the summer. Our first opportunity to win a prize was through the Harvard Social Enterprise 
Conference Pitch for Change Competition. We were finalists, and we had the opportunity to pitch 
in front of a 1,000-person audience. Although we were not one of the judges’ top three picks, we did 
take home the Audience Choice Award. Knowing that the problem of rural distribution resonated 
with audience members was encouragement enough for us. 
For the next few competitions, we came close but ended up not placing. We were third in 
the region for the Global Social Venture Competition, but we did not make it to the finals (top two 
travel to the finals). We made it to the finals for the Tufts $100K Business Plan Competition and the 
Harvard Business School Business Plan Competition Social Venture Track, but we did not win any 
money. We were not even selected as MIT $100K Business Plan Competition Emerging Markets 
Track Semi-Finalists. With every disappointment, we revamped our business plan and our 
presentation, making multiple versions for different audiences, and reframing the problem in words 
that business-minded people or people without experience in developing countries could 
understand. This was tricky – given the amount of input that we were receiving from judges and 
advisors, we had to discern what advice to take seriously, what advice to take with a grain of salt, and 
what is most important to us as Essmart. This is something that we are still struggling through. 
Our first big break was becoming a finalist for the Harvard President’s Challenge. Only 10 
finalists were chosen from a pool of over 170 applicants, and we received US$5,000 to use on a 
second pilot in Pollachi. Our next big break came with a US$10,000 win from the MIT IDEAS 
Global Challenge – the highest prize amount that was offered. This was so encouraging, and we are 
thankful to all of the individuals at MIT who have supported us since Essmart’s beginnings. Soon 
after this announcement, we learned that we were selected as finalists for the Dell Social Innovation 
Challenge, an international competition that had over 1,700 participants this year. In early June, 
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Jackie and I will be presenting at the finals in Austin, Texas. We are also meeting with Boston-based 
angel investors, whose support will help us invest in our first warehouse and batch of inventory. 
4.4 Thoughts: Establishing Mutually Dependent Stakeholder Relationships 
with Shop Owners at Scale is Key to Essmart’s Success 
Finally, my experiences in India and in the innovation-for-development ecosystem at MIT 
have led me to seriously think about the types of relationships that are required for successful BOP 
business models. Ultimately, the key to Essmart’s success depends on our mutually beneficial, 
mutually dependent relationships with BOP retailers. 
Yes, shop owners are Essmart’s “customers” due to the money exchange that happens 
between us. However, they are also Essmart’s primary business partners and, eventually, mutually 
dependent stakeholders. Essmart’s long-term relevance at the BOP depends squarely on the extent 
that rural retailers believe they have a stake in the company’s growth. Essmart obviously needs these 
retailers to grow and will benefit from their economic success. But retailers must see that the reverse 
is true, too – that they will reap direct and indirect economic benefits as Essmart grows. The 
relationships that we establish with these rural shopkeepers must reflect these subtleties. 
Most of the literature about BOP partnerships involves MNCs’ relationships with local 
communities, NGOs, MFIs, other civil sector organizations, local governments, and research 
institutions. Some characteristics from these relationships apply to Essmart’s relationships with local 
retailers. For example, scholars have pointed out that partnerships at the BOP exist to utilize 
partners’ resources: access to technology end users, appropriate capabilities such as being able to 
retail technologies (London and Hart, 2004), enhanced legitimacy (Jenkins, 2007; Garrette and 
Karnani, 2010), and enhancing our “social embeddedness,” which gives Essmart a competitive 
advantage that is based on retailers’ local knowledge (London and Hart, 2004; Justin et al., 2010). 
All of these rationales explain why Essmart should establish relationships at the BOP, but 
they do not explain why BOP retailers are incentivized to partner with Essmart. Inter-business 
alliances, like the partnerships that Essmart has with local shopkeepers, are not covered extensively 
in the literature. In rare occurrences, a WEF report (2009) and a UNDP report (2008) suggest that 
foreign and local ventures working in the BOP can benefit from aligning complementary 
investments, pooling resources, building the skills of entrepreneurs, sharing supply and distribution 
costs, and joining as stakeholders to negotiate with governments and other companies. The example 
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of International Development Enterprises India has demonstrated that partnerships with existing 
BOP companies can build supply chains and create positive spillover effects by generating 
competition and providing jobs (Samad and Swaraj, 2010). But beyond these examples, little has 
been documented. 
Demonstrating Essmart’s benefits to rural retail shopkeepers is something that our team has 
been struggling with. The incentive of increasing revenues is not enough. Entrepreneurial 
shopkeepers have plenty of other options to make more money, such as offering services like selling 
bus tickets or recharging mobile phones. These offerings are much less risky for rural shopkeepers 
to take on than Essmart’s catalogue of new products. 
Essmart needs to position itself as more than a distributor, and even as more than a 
distributorship+. Similar to the way that HP provides more to its small business customers than 
computer hardware, Essmart needs to serve rural retail shops in ways that they currently are not 
being served, thus enhancing their businesses. In practical terms, so far we have considered offering 
shopkeeper skills training sessions, as many indicated during our January 2012 surveys that they want 
to learn how to better manage their inventory and learn how to communicate more effectively. 
Additional ideas have also included leveraging shops’ collective bargaining power to advocate for 
services from financial institutions (they currently operate independently, but we unite them into an 
Essmart retailer network), restocking their shelves, and even providing better signage so that they 
can differentiate themselves from other shops.  
The difficulty will be establishing and maintaining these relationships at scale and in a cost-
effective manner. One solution might an extensive use of communication technologies, but we will 
need to see what is available in the field and appropriate for our retail shopkeepers. 
The summer of 2012 will mark the start of an extended period of pilots. We still need to 
experiment with Essmart’s supply chain options, implement Logistimo’s mobile phone software 
with our retailers, and establish procedures with Essmart’s sales agents, among many other tasks. 
Most importantly, we need to foster trust-based relationships with rural retail shop owners and 
communicate with them about how we can serve them better. Essmart needs shopkeepers’ beliefs in 
its ability to build their businesses. This is the only way that we will have long-term business success 
at the BOP. 
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5 Final Thoughts 
Today’s bottom-up, innovation-for-development movement is not making a huge social 
impact at the Bottom of the Pyramid. This is not for lack of trying. However, most of the efforts are 
made in designing technologies, not in disseminating them. No matter how many fantastic widgets 
for development are created, they are designed in vain if they are not disseminated to end users at 
scale and in a financially viable way. 
In this thesis, I have discussed previous failures in the dissemination of social impact 
technologies. The Appropriate Technology movement inspired technological design for 
development, but it barely considered scalable, financially sustainable dissemination. Multinational 
corporations’ attempts to sell social impact products and technologies failed because they focused 
on selling their way into the BOP. Their relationship with the BOP was somewhat exploitative, and 
this did not lead to financial sustainability. 
Then I took to the field in rural India, where I saw numerous examples of small and medium 
enterprises experimenting with business models for technology dissemination. No one has been able 
to achieve a scalable, financially sustainable model yet. There are multiple reasons for this, including 
the difficulties encountered by manufacturers when they try to create and operate their own 
distribution channels, the overreliance on door-to-door rural entrepreneurs, who are difficult to 
identify and scale, and the lack of technology aggregation, which has the potential to lower 
dissemination costs.  
Based on these findings in the field, I co-founded Essmart, a rural distributor of social 
impact technologies. Its goals are to bridge the gap between global manufacturers of social impact 
technologies and rural communities. The company aggregates technologies, demonstrates them in 
partnership with rural retail shops, makes them available in these stores, and facilitates 
manufacturers’ warranties to ensure their long-term social impact. 
From my research and fieldwork with Essmart, I came to see the importance of building 
mutually beneficial and mutually dependent relationships with BOP actors. For a business to remain 
relevant at the BOP, its customers must have stake in the company’s growth. They must want to see 
the company succeed because of the benefits it brings to them. Only then will they invest in a 
company’s long-term presence and operations on the ground. This is why multinational companies 
failed to make inroads at the BOP, despite their very deep pockets. Their customers did not care 
whether or not they were there. 
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Naturally, this lengthy research process has raised more questions for further inquiry. The 
first question has to do again with the quality of relationships between companies and customers at 
the BOP. They will necessarily have to be built on trust, since economic returns are not immediate, 
nor are they enough to solidify a long-term relationship as other obstacles, like competitors, arise. 
But what does it take to develop trust? How does a foreign company develop trust with local 
companies? How do the qualities of being an outsider, applied to both an entire organization and to 
an individual, affect how trust is developed at the BOP? Of course, these questions take on much 
more color when directly applied to Essmart’s relationships with rural retail shops and partnering 
organizations. I am coming to see my limitations – and possibly my assets – that come with being 
young, American-born, and female. As our team pursues this venture on the ground, I am aware 
that careful practice and reflection are required to build Essmart’s relationships, which are 
foundational to the company’s growth. 
The topic of beneficial relationships can also be applied to the global innovation-for-
development community, which could benefit from more collaboration between innovators. Due to 
the competition-based incentive structure that rewards individual innovators, similar projects 
compete independently instead of jointly for the same cash prizes. The lack of sharing and growth 
of egos contribute to the presence many small, similar efforts instead of a few large, concerted ones. 
How can incentives be shaped to encourage innovative, radical thinking for development while 
supporting collaboration between innovators? 
Although this thesis marks the end of my research as an MIT student, I do not consider it to 
be the end of my work in technology dissemination and the innovation-for-development 
community. I look forward to experimenting and learning on the ground through Essmart, and I 
look forward to someday seeing billions of lives changed by technology innovation and 
dissemination for Bottom of the Pyramid development.
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